Skip to main content

Part of the book series: The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science ((WONS,volume 4))

Abstract

When a theory is confronted by new phenomena, should every effort be made to give an account of these phenomena within the confines of that theory, or should the theory be amended so as to provide an account? Philosophy of science used to answer that the criterion of success of a theory is that it need not be amended to provide an account for new phenomena. But in a science’s growing stages, the practice is to amend theories as fast as new phenomena can be found.

Research for this paper was supported by Canada Council grant S71–0546.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. N. D. Belnap Jr., ‘Conditional Assertion and Restricted Quantification’, Nous 4 (1970), 1–12.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. H. Kamp, ‘Formal Properties of ‘Now’ ’, Theoria 37 (1971), 227–273.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. K. Segerberg, ‘Two-Dimensional Modal Logic’, Journal of Philosophical Logic (forthcoming); D. Lewis, ‘Anselm and Actuality’, Nous 4 (1970), 175–188

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. D. Kaplan, ‘The Logic of Demonstratives’, mimeographed UCLA 1971. Credit for priority must reportedly be given to the doctoral dissertation (UCLA, 1972) of F. Vlach.

    Google Scholar 

  5. P. F. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory, Methuen, London, 1952.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Cf. B. van Fraassen, Formal Semantics and Logic, Macmillan Co., New York, 1971, Ch. V, Section 3.

    Google Scholar 

  7. R. H. Thomason, ‘Indeterminist Time and Truth-Value Gaps’, Theoria 36 (1970), 264–281.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. J. M. Dunn, ‘Comments on N. D. Belnap, Jr.’s ‘Conditional Assertion and Restricted Quantification’ ’, American Philosophical Association, Western Division Annual Meeting, St. Louis, May 1970.

    Google Scholar 

  9. N. Rescher, The Logic of Commands, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1966.

    Google Scholar 

  10. R. Manor, ‘Conditional Forms: Assertion, Necessity, Obligation and Commands’, Doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1971.

    Google Scholar 

  11. B. van Fraassen, loc. cit. (note 5)

    Google Scholar 

  12. or B. van Fraassen, ‘Presuppositions, Super-valuations, and Free Logic’, in K. Lambert (ed.), The Logical Way of Doing Things, pp. 67–91, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1969.

    Google Scholar 

  13. For an introduction, see Sections I and II of B. van Fraassen, ‘Semantic Analysis of Quantum Logic’, in C. A. Hooker (ed.), Contemporary Research in the Foundation and Philosophy of Quantum Theory, D. Reidel Publ. Co., Dordrecht, 1973.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

D. Hockney W. Harper B. Freed

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1975 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Van Fraassen, B.C. (1975). Incomplete Assertion and Belnap Connectives. In: Hockney, D., Harper, W., Freed, B. (eds) Contemporary Research in Philosophical Logic and Linguistic Semantics. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1756-5_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1756-5_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0512-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-1756-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics