Abstract
The concept of philosophy as rigorous science6 emerged in close relation to Husserl’s critical attitude to European philosophy in its factual form. Husserl, who came over to philosophy from mathematics, condemned not only the many existing philosophies but also — as he said — the unending “quarrels” (Hader) between philosophers but first and foremost the mode of philosophizing inside each system with the help of undefined fundamental concepts, the assertion of theorems without demonstration, the tendency to construct systems as closed theoretical entities without taking any care of their relation to reality and so on. All these problems made impossible the reconciliation of different trends and the discovery of a firm foundation for philosophy. Husserl fought all his life for this firm foundation,7 for clarity, for distinction between all that was frequently rather carelessly confused. But above all he fought for responsibility in philosophical research and devoted many years to the elaboration of a method which, according to him, was to secure for philosophy the status of a science.
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References
Cf. Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, Logos, vol. I, 1911.
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© 1975 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Ingarden, R. (1975). The Concept of Philosophy as Rigorous Science. In: On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism. Phaenomenologica, vol 64. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1689-6_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1689-6_3
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