Abstract
In the XX century Christian philosophers have frequently disputed over the possibility of working out an adequate system of ethics from pure reason alone. The greatest majority are of the opinion that this cannot be done. Why so? Because ethics is not a speculative but a practical science, it is not an abstract but an existential one: its task is not to study the final end of human nature as such, but to consider the final end of human nature in its historical situation, and this is the setting for a new, special relationship with God, who has called man to become his partner and sharer of his very own life. Now, if such is the case, it is clear that reason alone is unable to instruct man on his true final end and to guide him efficiently towards the attainment of such an end. Should reason claim itself capable of this, it would be guilty of the same sin of Lucifer and of Adam and Eve, since to become like God is absolutely beyond the power of any creature.1
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References
E. GILSON, Christianity and Philosophy, New York-London 1939; ID. La philosophie et la théologie, Paris 1960
J. MARITAIN, De la philosophie chretienne, Paris 1933; ID., On the Philosophy of History, New York 1957
R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, ‘De relationibus inter philosophiam et religionem ac de natura philosophiae christianae’, Acta II Congressus thomistici internationalis, Torino-Roma 1937, pp. 379–394
C. JOURNET, Introduction à la théologie, Paris 1947.
‘Beatitudo cum sit naturaliter ab omnibus desiderata, nominat ultimum humanae naturae finem’ (In IV Sent. d. 49, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1). ‘Beatitudo sive felicitas est in perfectissima operatione habentis rationem vel intellectum’ (In II Sent. d. 4, q. 1, a. 1). ‘Finis humanae vitae est felicitas: unde secundum diversas vitas etiam distinguuntur diversae felicitates…’ (In III Sent. d. 27, q. 2, a. 2). Cf. In III Sent. d. 9, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 7 ad 2m; In III Sent. d. 27, q. 2, a. 3 ad 5m. Therefore Kluxen’s opinion according to which St. Thomas employs ‘felicitas’ for man’s natural end, whereas he employs ‘beatitudo’ for his supernatural end, is untenable. Cf. W. KLUXEN, Philosophische Ethik bei Thomas von Aquin, Mainz 1964, p. 108, n. 1.
Cf. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, 1176a–1181b and also H.H. Joachim’s Commentary to this work (Oxford 1951, pp. 286–297).
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© 1976 Martinus Nijhott, The Hague, Netherlands
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Mondin, B. (1976). The Contemplation of God as Man’s Natural End. In: St. Thomas Aquinas’ Philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1679-7_6
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