Abstract
Martin Heidegger in many of his writings1 launches against the philosophers who came after Parmenides, especially Plato, Aristotle and other metaphysicians of antiquity and of the Middle Ages, the imputation of having betrayed the fundamental task of philosophy, namely the study of being, and of having diverted philosophical inquiry from the study of being itself to the study of individual beings (numbers, primary substances, God, etc.) and, in such wise, of having brought about “the oblivion of being”.
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References
M. HEIDEGGER, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen 1927
M. HEIDEGGER Einführung in die Metaphysik, Tübingen 1953
M. HEIDEGGER Unterwegs zur Sprache, Pfullingen 1959.
E. GILSON, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, New York 1956
L.D. DE RAEYMAEKER, “L’idée inspiratrice de la métaphysique thomiste”, Aquinas 1960, pp. 61–82
C. FABRO, Tomismo e pensiero moderno, Roma 1969.
M.D. CHENU, Introduction à l’étude de saint Thomas d’Aquin, Paris 1950.
AUGUSTIN, Sermo VII, n. 7; Migne, t. 38, c. 66.
“Deum nihil aliud dicam esse nisi idipsum esse” (Augustin, De moribus ecclesiae XIV, c 24; Migne, t. 32, c 1321). “Sola est incommutabilis substantia vel essentia, qui Deus est, cui profecto ipsum esse, unde essentia nominata est maxime et verissime competit” (Augustin, De Trinitate V, 2, 3; Migne, t. 42, c 912).
“Humano quippe animo non hoc est esse quod est fortem esse, aut prudentem, aut iustum aut temperantem: potest enim esse animus, et nullam istarum habere virtutem. Deo autem hoc est esse quod est fortem esse aut iustum esse, aut sapientem esse, et si quid de illa simplici multiplicitate, vel multiplici simplicitate dixeris, quo substantia eius significet” (Augustin, De Trinitate VI, 4, 6; Migne, t. 42, c 927).
E. GILSON, Introduction à l’étude de saint Augustin, Paris 1949, p. 287, n. 1.
E. GILSON, op. cit., p. 27.
There is a general agreement among historians in considering Avicenna as the first assertor of the real distinction. Here we shall merely cite the opinion of Roland-Gosselin, who is one of the greatest experts on this subject: “Très certainement Avicenne distingue l’existence de l’essence, et jusqu’à dire que l’esse est accidentel à l’essence. L’essence est quelque chose; Yesse, en un sens, quelque chose d’autre qui advient à l’essence possible, même immatérielle, par l’action de la Cause première. En cette dernière au contraire, il n’y a aucune distinction; et même à rigueur d’expression, l’Etre nécessaire n’a pas d’essence” (M.D. Roland-Gilson, Le “De ente et essentia” de Saint Thomas d’Aquin, Paris 1948, p. 156).
Cf. S. VANNI ROVIGHI, “La prima scolastica”, in Grande antologia filosofica, Milano 1954, vol. IV, p. 720.
“In nullius autem ratione accipitur esse, quidquid imaginati fuerimus sive hominem sive asinum sive aliud, ut in ratione eius esse intelligamus; eo solo excepto de quo essentialiter dicitur. Eius namque essentia nisi per ipsum esse intelligi potest, cum ipsa et eius esse omnimodo sint una res” (GUILIELMI ALVENIAE, Opera omnia, Parisiis 1674, T. II, Suppl., De Trinitate, cap. 1, p. 2). On William of Auvergne’s doctrine concerning the real distinction between essence and existence see A. MASNOVO, Da Guglielmo d’Auvergne a san Tommaso d’Aquino, Milano 1945, vol. I, pp. 88–109.
Ibid., T. I, p. 852.
MASNOVO, op. cit., p. 115.
F. van STEENBERGHEN, Aristotle in the West; The Origins of Latin Aristotelianism, Louvain 1955
M. GRABMANN, “Mittelalterliche Aristotelesübersetzungen und Aristoteleskommentare in Handschriften spanischer Bibliotheken”, Sitzungsberichte der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, München 1928, Heft 5.
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, V, c 7.
Aristotle, Analytica posteriora, II, c 7.—J. Owens rightly remarks that the real distinction between essence and existence was a problem for which Aristotle could not have any interest at all: “In a philosophy which is conditioned by this fundamental doctrine of Being (=Form), the absence of any treatment of existence is inevitable… The contingent and the infinite have no place in this contemplation. What is not form or reducible to form, has no interest for the Primary Philosophy. Accordingly, in the treatment of the principle of non-contradiction, in the study of efficient causality, in the relation of sensible to separate Entity, no mention is made of any existential problems. The highest instance of Being is Form and it is that Form that is studied by the Primary Philosophy in all the other instances. An act like that of existence which is irreducible to form has no place in the Primary Philosophy or in any science” (J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in Aristotelian Metaphysics, Toronto 1957, p. 296).
Ibid., a. 2 sol.
In I Sent. d. 3, q. 1, a. 1 ad 1m.
C. FABRO, Esegesi tomistica, Roma 1969.
Cf. B. MONDIN, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology, The Hague 1968, pp. 40–51.
The term “existentia” occurs also in other works of St. Thomas. Cf. De veritate q. 1, a. 2 ad 3m; In VII metaph. 17, n. 1658.
In I Sent. d. 8, q. 4, a. 2.
Ibid. q. 5, a. 1, contra, praet.
S. Theol. I, q. 7, a. 1.
“Dès les débuts de sa carrière, saint Thomas affirme nettement la distinction d’essence et d’être au sein du créé… Dès ses premiers écrits, non seulement saint Thomas affirme la distinction d’essence et d’être, mais encore il lui donne une place vraiment centrale; loin de l’admettre comme une thèse accessoire, bonne pour résoudre une difficulté de détail, il en fait une source féconde d’explication, un nœud de synthèse” (J. De Finance, Etre et agir dans la philosophie de saint Thomas d’Aquin, Paris 1945, pp. 94–96).
L. De RAEYMAEKER, Riflessioni su terni filosofici fondamentali, Milano 1957, pp. 20–21.
Cf. J. B. LOTZ, “Die Frage nach dem Fundament bei Heidegger und in der Scholastik”, Sapienza 1973, pp. 280–331.
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© 1975 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Mondin, B. (1975). The Metaphysics of Being. In: St. Thomas Aquinas’ Philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1679-7_4
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