Abstract
I want to argue against some methods but not all and first give some reasons for not wanting to argue against all of them. To claim to know that there are no methods is surely to claim more than can be cogently claimed since it would have to be based upon some argument which would itself presuppose the acceptance of some method of arguing. There cannot be a cogent argument against all argument. The search for method is, after all, a search for generalisations about our procedures and there is already an abundant supply of such generalisations over restricted ranges of procedures. My problem here is that of explaining why in certain cases the attempt to generalise breaks down. The area that I have in mind in which unrestricted generalisations are tried out is conventionally called Philosophy and my question might be put as: Under what conditions do philosophical generalisations break down? I am looking for an explanation of these failures.
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Notes
T. Skolem, Abstract Set Theory, Notre Dame Mathematical Lectures No. 8, 1962, pp. 1–2.
Gödel, K., ‘What is Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis?’ in P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam (eds.), Philosophy of Mathematics, 1964, p. 220. See also Kreisel, G., ‘Mathematical Logic’, Lectures on Modern Mathematics, Vol. 3 (ed. by T. L. Saaty), p. 186, for the appeal to ‘mathematical experience’.
Feyerabend, P., ‘Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem’ in C. V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Thesis, 1970, pp. 142–156.
Feyerabend, P., ‘Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem’ in C. V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Thesis, 1970, pp. 142–156op. cit. 150, line 10, “A new theory of pains will not change the pains”.
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© 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
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Tucker, J. (1976). Against Some Methods. In: Cohen, R.S., Feyerabend, P.K., Wartofsky, M.W. (eds) Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 39. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1451-9_37
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1451-9_37
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