Abstract
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 1and Kuhn’s afterthoughts (1970a, 1974) have been subjected to so much penetrating criticism that any further examination might be supposed redundant.2 There are, however, two epistemological theses in his work which have not, in my opinion, received adequate analysis. They are not essentially dependent upon considerations of Gestalt switches, theory-ladenness of observation, incommensurability, or the ambiguity of the word ‘paradigm’, which have received much critical attention.
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Shimony, A. (1976). Comments on Two Epistemological Theses of Thomas Kuhn. In: Cohen, R.S., Feyerabend, P.K., Wartofsky, M.W. (eds) Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 39. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1451-9_32
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1451-9_32
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