Abstract
I wish that I had a paper for this volume which was closer to Imre Lakatos’ own philosophical interests. He worked on questions which are central to our scientific and intellectual culture. His contributions to these questions conveyed a profound sense of excitement, adventure and progress. What I offer here is something on a very much smaller scale. Nevertheless, any philosophy of science must not merely make use of, but must investigate, the notion of observation and so the notion of perception. In what follows I try to sort out what is living and what is dead in the notion of immediate perception.
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Bibliography
Armstrong, D. M., Perception and the Physical World, Routledge, London, 1961.
Armstrong, D. M., A Materialist Theory of the Mind, Routledge, London, 1968.
Armstrong, D. M., Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972.
Grice, H. P., ‘The Causal Theory of Perception’, Aristotelian Society Proceedings. Suppl. Vol. 35 (1961).
Unger, P., ‘Propositional Verbs and Knowledge’, Journal of Philosophy 59 (1972).
Warnock, G. J., ‘Seeing’, Aristotelian Society Proceedings 55 (1954–5).
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© 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
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Armstrong, D.M. (1976). Immediate Perception. In: Cohen, R.S., Feyerabend, P.K., Wartofsky, M.W. (eds) Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 39. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1451-9_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1451-9_3
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