Abstract
We shall be concerned with real possibility, such as the possibility of a physical event to happen. This kind of possibility is predicated of factual items — things, properties of things, or changes in properties of things. Real possibility is then radically different from conceptual possibility, such as the satisfiability of a formula in a model or the confirmability of a hypothesis by empirical evidence. Conceptual possibility concerns constructs, not things, and it is elucidated without the help of the probability concept — nor, for that matter, is it clarified with the help of modal logics. Not so real possibility: it concerns concrete objects and it is sometimes elucidated in probabilistic terms.
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Bibliography
Bunge, Mario, Philosophy of Physics, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1973.
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Popper, Karl, Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 10 (1959), 25.
Terletskii, Ya. P., Statistical Physics (transl. by N. Froman), North-Holland, Amsterdam, Elsevier, New York 1971.
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© 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
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Bunge, M. (1976). Possibility and Probability. In: Harper, W.L., Hooker, C.A. (eds) Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 6c. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1438-0_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1438-0_2
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