Abstract
In the subjectivist’s interpretation of probability, probability refers to the degree of belief or confidence an individual associates with a proposition. It is not supposed that there is a correct or true probability. The theory of subjective probability assumes only that the individual holds a consistent body of beliefs concerning some propositions. The individual is supposed to choose an expression of his uncertainty that is in agreement with his feelings on the issue in question.
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© 1977 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
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Schaefer, R.E., Borcherding, K., Laemmerhold, C. (1977). Consistency of Future Event Assessments. In: Jungermann, H., De Zeeuw, G. (eds) Decision Making and Change in Human Affairs. Theory and Decision Library, vol 16. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1276-8_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1276-8_21
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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