The Question of Moral Evil

Abstract

The attempt to solve the problem of evil in the way just expounded has been subjected to an ingenious attack by J. L. Mackie. In an article often referred to,¹ he points out that if we are to assume that charity, compassion and so on are such desirable qualities, it is worthwhile having earthquakes, hurricanes and all sorts of dreadful diseases just for the sake of securing their existence, then cruelty, meanness and the like are of a comparable degree of undesirability. Just as we have said that the man who responds virtuously to suffering does far more good than just lessening the amount of suffering in the world — for he also enhances his moral character — so we would have to agree that a man who responds callously to suffering does much more evil than just leaving suffering to continue, which he could have alleviated, by debasing his own character. If it is claimed that God has greatly improved the world by providing opportunities for virtuous responses to suffering to exist, then it would also have to be admitted that he has impaired the world to no less degree by also providing opportunities for vicious responses. Surely the world could have been no worse off by having opportunities for neither.