Theism and the Verification Principle

Abstract

Recently, people with a strong empiricist bent, which may be said to be an outlook strongly inspired by modern science, have intensified their attacks on Theism. Instead of just claiming that Theism is not well founded and, therefore there are no reasons to believe it true, they have raised a more fundamental objection, denying that it has any meaning at all. According to this line of attack on Theism, not only is there nothing in our experience which confirms it, but in principle it is impossible that we could ever find experience confirming, or for that matter discontinuing, a belief in God. Any conceivable state of affairs is compatible both with the truth and the falsity of Theism; it makes no difference to what we might ever observe whether God exists or not. It is wrong, therefore, to assume that the theistic claim is a factual claim and that it has any cognitive significance. Hence, the question whether one should believe in the existence of God does not even arise. Sensible people do not altogether concern themselves with religious utterances which amount to empty verbiage. Even with the most pious intentions one cannot believe that the sentence ‘God exists’ expresses a true proposition when that sentence expresses no proposition at all, being altogether devoid of meaning.