Abstract
It is a well known rule of logic that when one tells a story and that story eventually leads to a contradiction then it follows by reductio that the story was an impossible one to begin with. But what element in our story must be rejected as impossible? Is it impossible to place two boxes before a player etc.? Surely not. The most likely candidate for rejection is the assertion which did not amount to the description of an observed fact but which we thought was based on inductive evidence, namely that the predictor is virtually infallible as evidenced by his past performance. (It will turn out in Chapter 15 that it is not the case that the proficiency of the predictor qua predictor could ever be established by any evidence.) We shall deny, then, that our so called predictor has great powers of prediction.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1977 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Schlesinger, G. (1977). The Unpredictability of Some Human Choices. In: Religion and Scientific Method. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 10. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1235-5_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1235-5_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0816-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-1235-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive