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The Natures of Judgment and Belief

  • Jaakko Hintikka
  • Robert S. Cohen
  • Donald Davidson
  • Gabriël Nuchelmans
  • Wesley C. Salmon
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 104)

Abstract

It is natural and usual in a theory of judgment to distinguish the content of a judgment, what is judged, usually a proposition, from the act of judging. There are theories, most notably Hume’s, in which this is not done. The difficulties which such theories encounter result for the most part from the difficulty they have in allowing the mind to entertain or assume the same proposition which it might also judge. I postpone until succeeding sections the question of how such theories may be modified to meet these problems and turn initially to theories in which the act is distinguished from the content.

Keywords

Operative Character Mentalistic Account Pragmatic Account Partial Belief Behavioristic View 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1976

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jaakko Hintikka
    • 1
  • Robert S. Cohen
    • 2
  • Donald Davidson
    • 3
  • Gabriël Nuchelmans
    • 4
  • Wesley C. Salmon
    • 5
  1. 1.Academy of Finland and Stanford UniversityUSA
  2. 2.Boston UniversityUSA
  3. 3.University of ChicagoUSA
  4. 4.University of LeydenUSA
  5. 5.University of ArizonaUSA

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