Abstract
The main thrust of John Watkins’s paper (Watkins, 1977) is criticism of the Bayesian approach. The strange thing is that he never even mentions the standard arguments for the Bayesian approach, and certainly makes no attempt to refutethese arguments. In fact, he writes as if he were quite unfamiliar with the basic literature on Bayesian theory, which contains a thorough discussion of these arguments.
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Bibliography
Aumann, R. J. and Maschler, M.: 1972, ‘Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle’, Management Science 18, 54–63.
Luce, R. D. and Raiffa, H.: 1957, Games and Decisions, John Wiley & Sons, New York.
Watkins, J. W. N.: 1977, this volume, p. 345.
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© 1977 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Harsanyi, J.C. (1977). On the Rationale of the Bayesian Approach: Comments on Professor Watkins’s Paper. In: Butts, R.E., Hintikka, J. (eds) Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 10. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1141-9_23
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1141-9_23
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