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Some Philosophical Problems of Hintikka’s Possible Worlds Semantics

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Logic, Foundations of Mathematics, and Computability Theory

Part of the book series: The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science ((WONS,volume 9))

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Abstract

A paradoxical situation has taken place of late in discussion of the philosophical problems of quantified modal logic. On the one hand, the works by S. Kripke, J. Hintikka, and S. Kanger1 have shown the possibility of constructing a satisfactory semantics for modal systems, the so-called possible worlds semantics. On the other hand, this formal satisfactoriness has left a lot of philosophical problems unsolved, the most significant of which have been suggested by W. V. Quine2. A number of recently proposed concepts are calculated to refute the philosophical objections of W. V. Quine, proceeding from semantic methods: the concept of individuating function, introduced by Hintikka, is the most important of them3.

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Notes

  1. S. Kripke, ‘Semantical Considerations on Modal Logics’, Acta Philosophica Fennica 16 (1963) 83–94.

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  2. S. Kanger, Provability in Logic, Stockholm Studies in Philosophy, vol. I, Stockholm, 1957.

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  3. J. Hintikka, ‘Modality as Referential Multiplicity’ Ajatus 20 (1957) 49–64.

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  4. W. V. O. Quine, ‘Three Grades of Modal Involvement’ The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, N.Y., 1966.

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  5. J. Hintikka, ‘The Semantics of Modal Notions and the Indeterminacy of Ontology’ Synthese 21 (1970), 708–727.

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  6. I am very grateful to Prof. Hintikka for his permission to use results unpublished at the time, especially ‘Quine on Quantifying In’ and ‘Carnap’s Semantics in Retrospect’. Later these papers appeared as Chapters 5 and 6 of Hintikka’s Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities, D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland, 1975. I am also grateful for Prof. Hintikka’s valuable suggestions during my visit to the Institute of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, summer 1974.

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  7. J. Hintikka, ‘On the Logic of Perception’ Models for Modalities, D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland, 1969, p. 179.

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  8. J. Hintikka, ‘Carnap’s Heritage in Logical Semantics’ p. 91 (note 4 above).

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© 1977 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Tselishchev, V.V. (1977). Some Philosophical Problems of Hintikka’s Possible Worlds Semantics. In: Butts, R.E., Hintikka, J. (eds) Logic, Foundations of Mathematics, and Computability Theory. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1138-9_20

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1138-9_20

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-1140-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-1138-9

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