Abstract
The problem of construction and justification of an empirical prediction theory (perhaps, it is the main aspect of the ‘problem of induction’) is investigated in the present paper. One fundamental obstacle arises here: the statement S “A prediction theory f 1 will predict in the future more successfully than a prediction theory f 2” is, generally speaking, meaningless because there is no method of verification or falsification of this statement. Neither a deduction from formerly established facts nor a distinct empirical observation is such a method. So we deal with the pseudoproblem here.
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© 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Samochwalow, K. (1976). The Impossibility Theorem for Universal Theory of Prediction. In: Przełęcki, M., Szaniawski, K., Wójcicki, R., Malinowski, G. (eds) Formal Methods in the Methodology of Empirical Sciences. Synthese Library, vol 103. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1135-8_31
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1135-8_31
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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