Abstract
Let’s take the following question as our point of departure: ‘what constitutes an ontological commitment?’ Due to reasons which will only become clear in the course of our discussion, it proves useful to put this question in a linguistic form and to give it the following formulation: ’What are the criteria in terms of which we decide the ontological commitment of a person using a particular language?’ An obvious answer that readily comes to mind is the following: when the user B of a particular language uses names, then all the objects designated by these names are to be credited to his ontology. The same holds for so-called definite descriptions (briefly: descriptions), that is, expressions of the form ‘the so and so’ (‘the author of “Wallenstein” ’, ‘the conqueror of Mt. Everest’); according to B the objects to which such descriptions refer are also included among the existing. Finally all the properties and relations about which B can formulate statements by means of the predicate- terms occurring in his language will be assumed by B to exist.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
W.V. Quine was the first to point this out; cf. hisMathematical Logic, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, p. 149.
W.V. Quine seems to have been the first to have realized this; cf. his essay ‘On What There Is’ reprinted inFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, Mass., 1954, pp. 1–19.
N. Goodman and W.V.Quine, ‘Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism’,Journal of Symbolic Logic12 (1947), 105–122.
R. Carnap ’Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’ reprinted in: L. Linsky Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, Urbana 1952, pp. 208–228.
W.V. Quine ‘On Carnap’s Views on Ontology’, Philosophical Studies 2 (1951), No. 5, pp. 65–70.
R.M. Martin, ‘On “Analytic” ’, Philosophical Studies 3 (1952), 42–47.
Cf. A. Tarski, ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages’, Studia Philosophical (1936).
R. Carnap, ‘Meaning Postulates’, Philosophical Studies 3 (1952), p. 65–73.
W.V. Quine, ‘Meaning in Linguistics’, p. 56; reprinted in: From a Logical Point of View, pp. 47–64.
R. Carnap, ‘Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages’, Philosophical Studies 6 (1955), 33–46.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1977 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Stegmüller, W. (1977). Ontology and Analyticity. In: Collected Papers on Epistemology, Philosophy of Science and History of Philosophy. Synthese Library, vol 91. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1129-7_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1129-7_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-1131-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-1129-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive