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Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 91))

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Abstract

Let’s take the following question as our point of departure: ‘what constitutes an ontological commitment?’ Due to reasons which will only become clear in the course of our discussion, it proves useful to put this question in a linguistic form and to give it the following formulation: ’What are the criteria in terms of which we decide the ontological commitment of a person using a particular language?’ An obvious answer that readily comes to mind is the following: when the user B of a particular language uses names, then all the objects designated by these names are to be credited to his ontology. The same holds for so-called definite descriptions (briefly: descriptions), that is, expressions of the form ‘the so and so’ (‘the author of “Wallenstein” ’, ‘the conqueror of Mt. Everest’); according to B the objects to which such descriptions refer are also included among the existing. Finally all the properties and relations about which B can formulate statements by means of the predicate- terms occurring in his language will be assumed by B to exist.

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References

  • W.V. Quine was the first to point this out; cf. hisMathematical Logic, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, p. 149.

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© 1977 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Stegmüller, W. (1977). Ontology and Analyticity. In: Collected Papers on Epistemology, Philosophy of Science and History of Philosophy. Synthese Library, vol 91. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1129-7_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1129-7_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-1131-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-1129-7

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