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Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 87))

Abstract

One might look for connections between the notion of analyticity and the problems of semantics or—in broader terms — semiotics in the definition of analytic judgements deriving from Kant, which, as it is known, involves the inclusion of the meaning of the predicate in the meaning of the subject. The above mentioned connections manifest themselves at present in numerous current definitions of the term ‘analytic sentence’, which, as a rule, involve such semantic terms as: ‘meaning’, ‘definition’, ‘synonymy’ and others. Many authors express the opinion that the concept of analyticity is indispensable in order to define certain semantic concepts. The concept of meaning comes to the foreground here. Rudolf Carnap, the author of one of the most important attemps to explicate this concept has used the concept of logical truth which —according to his intentions— is supposed to correspond to the old notion of analyticity.

A fragment of Ph.D. dissertation (1967). Translated by E. Ronowicz.

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References

  1. This principle may be considered to be the result of stating more precisely the condition of adequacy for the definition of logical truth adopted by Carnap. In the original this condition runs as follows: “A sentence is L-true in a semantic system S if and only if is true in S in such a way that its truth can be established on the basis of the semantical rules of the system S alone, without any reference to (extra-linguistic) facts.” Carnap [8], p. 10.

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  6. The symbol x i§Δ denotes the relation x i restricted to the set Δ.

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  13. The terminology concerning the graphs has been taken from Ore’s book [20].

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Authors

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Marian Przełęcki Ryszard Wójcicki

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© 1977 PWN - Polish Scientific Publishers - Warszawa

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Nowaczyk, A. (1977). Analytic Sentences in the Semantic System. In: Przełęcki, M., Wójcicki, R. (eds) Twenty-Five Years of Logical Methodology in Poland. Synthese Library, vol 87. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1126-6_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1126-6_22

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