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The Physical Magnitude and Experience

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Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 87))

Abstract

The title of this paper determines too large a subject. I am interested here in the problems concerning the operationist concept of physical magnitude: according to this concept, the sense of the terms denoting physical magnitudes is determined by description of respective measurement methods. The neopositivistic methodology —by which I mean the views of Carnap and his followers—has accepted the operationist ideas. According to the neopositivistic position, physical magnitudes are partly definable on the basis of observational terms. The definition of physical magritude consists of a system of postulates, which have the form of general implications; and their antecedents are formulated in observational language. Each postulate of such a system determines a method of measurement of the considered magnitude. For short, we shall call these postulates ‘operational definitions’.

First published in Studia Filozoficzne 2 (41) (1965). Translated by S. Wojnicki.

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References

  1. L. Landau and E. Lifšic, Quantum Mechanics, 2nd ed., part I, Chap. 7, Pergamon Press, Oxford 1965.

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  2. H. Mehlberg, The Reach of Science, Chap. 17, Toronto 1958.

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  3. In short, we shall sometimes refer to ‘correct operations’ taking it implicite for granted that they are correct in relation to a given method.

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  4. Op. cit., p. 13.

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  5. The word ‘continuity’ is maybe not the best because of the discrete, as a rule, character of the set K; but I do not know of any better term.

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  6. M. A. Leontowicz, Fizyka statystyczna (Static Physics), Warszawa 1957, p. 91.

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  7. Op, cit., p. 235.

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  8. Perhaps it is worth stressing that we intend to understand symbol k in the sense that two different operations k1 and k2 may be carried out in the same moment of time (for instance by using a different instrument for each of these operations).

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  9. R. Carnap, ‘Beobachtungssprache und theoretische Sprache’, Dialéctica 12 (1958).

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  12. It is essential to the proof that one of the consequences of system (7.17) is the structure

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  13. It is questionable whether, in the case when the synthetic component of an arbitrary definition is false, the whole definition should be considered as a nonsensical utterance, or as a false sentence, and its analytical component —as a nonsensical utterance or as a true sentence. The first solution is supported by the argument that it is hardly possible to assign a determined meaning to a term which, as it has just been demonstrated, cannot be included in the language, because there exists no object being its denotatum.

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  14. Przełęcki considers postulates of the form (x)(Фlx⊃(Qx ≡ Ф2x)), (x)(Фlx⊃(Qx ≡ Ф4x)), in which the numerical variable a does not appear. This difference does not matter for the problem discussed further.

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Authors

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Marian Przełęcki Ryszard Wójcicki

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© 1977 PWN - Polish Scientific Publishers - Warszawa

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Mejbaum, W. (1977). The Physical Magnitude and Experience. In: Przełęcki, M., Wójcicki, R. (eds) Twenty-Five Years of Logical Methodology in Poland. Synthese Library, vol 87. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1126-6_20

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1126-6_20

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-1128-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-1126-6

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