Abstract
The problems of establishing historical facts are treated as side issues in the best known text-books of the historical method, despite the fact that establishing facts is one of the basic operations carried out by historians. Attention has traditionally been focused almost solely on source criticism, and hence the presentation of the principles of that criticism was followed immediately by descriptions of the methods of working out the data (formulation of syntheses). Some attention was paid to the process of establishing facts in those sections which are concerned with source criticism, the establishing of facts being treated there as the conclusion of the work on the “interpretation”of sources (cf. M. Handels-man), which was usually made to include what was termed comprehension of sources. Other comments on the issues now under consideration were discussed in sections on syntheses, thus confusing problems of the construction of historical descriptions with those of methods of establishing facts.
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References
Attention to this fact was drawn by A. Malewski and J. Topolski in Studia z metodologii historii (Studies in the Methodology of History), Warszawa 1960, pp. 6, 42, 59.
Cf. W. S. Jevons, The Principles of Science, New York 1877, p. 11; M. R. Cohen, Reason and Nature, p. 115; Z. Czerwinski, “O pojęciu wniosko-wania dedukcyjnego” (The Concept of Deductive Inference), Studia Filozoficz-ne, No. 4/1960, pp. 149-56.
Even those authors who are advocates of radical inductionism have to admit that in inductive inference we have to take “our previously acquired knowledge of the world” into consideration. See in this connection M. Gordon, O usprawiedliwieniu indukcji (The Justification of Induction), Warszawa 1964, pp. 96-8.
Z. Ziembiński classifies inference into deductive and probability-based (reductive, inductive, by analogy); see his Logika praktyczna (Practical Logic), Warszawa 1963, pp. 65 ff. There are various suggestions as to the classification of types of inference.
Distinction is usually made among: (1) induction by incomplete enumeration, (2) induction by complete enumeration, (3) induction by elimination.
S1 is P S2 is P Sn is P Conclusion: Every Sk is P, where k may be greater than n.
S1 is P S2 is P Sn is P S1 ⋃ … ⋃Sn=S Conclusion: Every St is P, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.The first is frustrated by schema (1), and the second by schema (2). The second differs from the first by being a result of complete (exhaustive) observations, which means that every 5t, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, has been examined. The first has an element of risk in the conclusion because, as not every Sk has been examined (the examination has covered only S1 to Sn, and it may turn out that an Sm, n <m ≤ k, is not P. Induction by complete enumeration (i.e., type (1)), does not carry this risk. Induction by elimination is a set of rules for finding out relationships among facts (rules based on the observations of co-occurrence of facts) which refers to Mill’s principles, formulated by him in 1843. The principle of agreement states that if fact A occurs always accompanied by fact B, then A is likely to be a cause of B. The principle of the only difference states that if A is always accompanied by B and if we find that if there is no A, then there is no B, then we may assume that A is likely to be a cause of B. The principle of concomitant variations is a variety of that of the only difference
Deductive inference follows some schema which always leads from true premisses to a true conclusion. Next to the schemata modus ponendo ponens (if (p ⇒ q) and p, then q), and modus tollendo tollens (if (p ⇒ q) and ⌝ q, then ⌝ p), already mentioned on an earlier occasion, we have to list the following elementary laws of the sentential calculus, used by historians in practice: (1)e Morgan’s first law: ⌝ (p ⋁q)if and only if) ⌝ p ⋀ ⌝ q), (2) De Morgan’s second law: ⌝ (p ⋀ q) if and only if (⌝ p ⋁ ⌝ q), (3) the law of contraposition: (p ⇒ q) if and only if (⌝ q ⇒ ⌝p), (4) the law of contradiction: ⌝ (p ⋀ ⌝ p), (5) the law of the excluded middle: p ⋁ ⌝ p (6) the law of double negation: ⌝⌝p if and only if p. The symbolism used above is to be interpreted thus: ⌝-negation, to be read “not”, ⋁-disjunction, to be read “or”, ⋀-conjunction, to be read “and”, ⇒-implication, to be read “if…, then…”.
Transformation of induction by incomplete enumeration into a deductive schema is to be found in M. R. Cohen. Cf. also the analysis of Mill’s principles carried out by K. Ajdukiewicz, who shows that the principle of the only difference is a kind of deductive inference in the light of a body of knowledge which includes the principle of causality (Pragmatic Logic, ed. cit., p. 170).
As shown by Carnap, inductive inference is unreliable. 9 See footnote 16 to Chap. XIV.
This term for the types of inference which follow “weakened”schemata has been suggested by Z. Czerwinski (“On the Relation of Statistical Inference to Traditional Induction and Deduction”, Studia Logica, vol. VII, 1958). In such types of inference, premisses are “weakened”by the addition of such modifications as “usually”, “on the whole”, “in most cases”, “probably”, etc. The degree of that weakening may vary; it is manifested in quasi-metric phrases, and in the case of statistical inference, in quantitative modifiers or other formulations.
Some new proposals concerning inference by analogy have been made by I. Danibska in her “Kilka uwag o rozumowaniach na podstawie analogii” (Some Comments on Reasonings Based on Analogy) in Rozprawy logiczne (Dissertations on Logic), Warszawa 1964, pp. 31–8. She pointed to the fact that some reasonings by analogy may be deductive. J. S. Mill claimed that reasoning by analogy is the elementary form of reasoning. T. Czezowski pointed to the role of reasoning by analogy in prediction and verification (cf. Filozofia na roz-drożu (Philosophy at Crossroads), éd. cit., pp. 82 ff).
H. Reichenbach in The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley 1951), Chap. 3, says that deduction is a void inference because the conclusion does not add anything to the premisses. He does not emphasize the fact that when truth is transferred from one statement to another, this means also a better knowledge of the world.
H. Łowmiański, Podstawy gospodarcze formowania się państw słowiań-skich (The Economic Foundations of the Formation of Slavonic States), War-szawa 1953, pp. 70–1.
This terminology was suggested by A. Malewski, and was later used by him and by the present writer in Studia z metodologii historii (Studies in the Methodology of History), ed. cit., pp. 58-60. In his review of that book (published in Studia Źródłoznawcze, vol. VII, 1962) J. Giedymin drew attention to the fact that the wording that a given source contains direct, or indirect, information is unclear. It is not known, in particular, whether non-written sources can contain direct information; if they could not, we could not say that an archaeologist used the inductive method. Now it must be said that non-written sources also may contain direct information about facts. For instance, an urn found by an archaeologist provides direct information about its shape, ornaments, etc.; on the other hand, it does not contain any direct information about the societal life of its makers and even about a given people’s stay in a given territory. When an archaeologist describes an urn, he makes use of the inductive method; but when he states something more on the strength of his finding, he also refers to his non-source-based knowledge and thus makes use of the “deductive”method. J. Giedymin also pointed to the fact that this suggested classification of methods was at variance with the classification of sources into direct and indirect, because then the indirect method would be applicable to direct sources, and the direct method, to indirect ones. It follows from what has been said earlier that these two classifications are made from different points of view.
It was J. Giedymin who analysed the concept of the independence of sources (cf. Problemy, zalozenia, rozstrzygnięcia (Problems, Assumptions, Decisions), ed. cit., p. 118.
According to M. Handelsman, one testimony provides only the knowledge that a fact is probable, whereas certainty can only be provided by confirmation by other testimonies (cf. Historyka, éd. cit., pp. 197-8).
Cf. his “Uogólnienie postulatu rozstrzygalności hipotez”(A Generalization of the Requirement of Decidability of Hypotheses), in Studia Filozoficzne, No. 5/1959.
An interesting case was quoted to the present writer by Zygmunt Man-kowski. In one of his works concerned with the resistance movement during the Nazi occupation of Poland he listed the participants in a conference, in which he mentioned a certain person. The said person, when writing his recol-lections, referred to Mankowski’s study and confirmed his attendance. It turned out later that Mankowski’s list of the participants was inaccurate, and that at any rate the said person did not attend that conference, as was later confirmed by Mankowski himself. Yet the person in question, when writing his memoirs, confirmed Mankowski’s mistake. Memoirs are to be written, but one must be exceptionally cautious when making use of them. G. T. Lampedusa was certainly right when he wrote that “keeping a diary or writing down one’s recollections ought to be a duty imposed by the state authorities; the material thus collected over a number of generations would be simply invaluable, since many psychological and historical problems which torture mankind could be solved. No memoirs, even if written by unimportant people, are devoid of great social and descriptive values (quoted from a Polish-language version of his selected stories”, published in Warszawa in 1964).
Cz. Luczak, Życie gospodarczo-spoleczne w Poznaniu 1815–1918 (Economic and Social Life in Poznan, 1815–1918), Poznan 1965, p. 101.
These methods are extensively discussed by A. Malewski and J. Topolski, op. cit., pp. 43 ff. Use is made of the conclusions arrived at by the present writer jointly with A. Malewski.
See his Studia z metodologii nauk spolecznych (Studies in the Methodology of the Social Sciences), ed. cit., Chap. “Pojęcia i wskaźniki”(Concepts and Indicators).
This and other examples are drawn from A. Malewski and J. Topolski, op. cit., pp. 43 ff; the same applies to specialized methods, ibid., pp. 60 ff, which also are drawn from the same work.
T. Wojciechowski, “O rocznikach polskich X-XV wieku”(Polish Annals from the 10th to the 15th Century), Proceedings of the Academy of Learning in Cracow, Section of Philology, History, and Philosophy, vol. IV, Kraków 1880, p. 193.
Ibid., p. 207.
Ibidem.
Ibid., p. 211.
A. Gieysztor, Introduction to T. Wojciechowski’s Szkice historyczne jede-nastego wieku (Historical Essays on the Eleventh Century), 3rd ed., Warszawa 1950, p. 15.
J. Widajewicz, Polska i Niemcy w dobie panowania Mieszka I (Poland and Germany at the Time of the Reign of Mieszko I), Lublin 1953, p. 60.
Cf. Th. Mommsen’s formulation: “Die sogenannte streng philologische Methode, das heißt einfach die rücksichtlos ehrliche, im grossen wie im kleinen von keiner Mühe scheuende, keinem Zweifel ausbiegende, keine Lücke der Ueberlieferung oder des eigenen Wissens übertünchende, immer sich selbst und anderen Redenschaft legende Wahrheitsforschung”. (Th. Mommsen, Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft, 3rd ed., Berlin 1927, p. 18).
K. Moszynski, Pierwotny zasięg języka praslowiańskiego (The Original Reach of the Proto-Slavonic Language), Wroclaw 1957. On his conclusions see H. Łowmiański, Początki Polski (The Origins of Poland), vol. I, Warszawa 1964, pp. 97-8.
K. Moszyński, op. cit., p. 260.
H. Łowmiański, Podstawy gospodarcze formowania się państw slowiańskich (The Economic Foundations of the Formation of Slavonic States), ed. cit., pp. 27 ff.
W. Semkowicz, “Włodycy polscy na tie porównawczym słowianskim”(The Polish Scartabelli Against the Comparative Slavonic Background), Kwartalnik Historyczny, vol. XXII, 1908, p. 597.
This example is more extensively discussed by A. Malewski and J. Topol-ski, op. cit., p. 67. On the geographical method see J. Rutkowski, Historia gos-podarcza Polski (An Economic History of Poland), vol. I, Poznan 1946, pp. 10-11. Aerial photography, whose precision has been increasing greatly, may be very instructive to historians. On this subject see the comprehensive geographical literature.
W. Dworzaczek, “Kto w Polsce dzierzył buławy”(Holders of Hetman’s Office in Poland), Roczniki Historyczne, 1951, vol. XIV, pp. 163–70.
W. Semkowicz, “Ród Awdańców w wiekach średnich”(The Awdaniec Family in the Middle Ages), Proceedings of the Poznan Society of Friends of Science, vol. XLIV, Poznan 1917, pp. 257 ff.
J. Rutkowski, op. cit., pp. 11–13.
See, for instance, J. Bardach, “O roli Normanów we wczesnośredniowiecz-nej Słowiańszczyźnie wschodniej”(The Role of the Normans in the Early Mediaeval Eastern Slavonic Countries), Kwartalnik History czny, No. 2/1958, p. 369. The comparative method in historical research is generally characterized by W. Kamieniecki thus: “The knowledge of the past of any nation must be completed by a comparative study of living standards, especially those developed by other nations. The method used in such research is called comparative”. (W. Kamieniecki, “O metodzie porównawczej w historii”(The Comparative Method in Historical Research), Kwartalnik History czny, R.:LV: 1948, p. 9) Kamieniecki is also right when he restricts the applicability of the comparative method (in the sense he uses) to facts which “belong to the same stage of development”(op. cit., p. 10).
The example is drawn from: G. Labuda, Pierwsze państwo slowiańskie. Państwo Samona (Samon’s State-the Earliest Slavonic State), Poznań 1949, pp. 293-4. The analysis of his reasoning is drawn from A. Malewski and J. Topolski, op. cit., pp. 49-50.
J. Bardach, op. cit., p. 369.
F. Persowski, “Osadnictwo w dorzeczu sredniego biegu Sanu. Próba rekon-strukcji krajobrazu z XV wieku”(Settlers in the Middle San Basin. A Tentative Reconstruction of the 15th Century Landscape), in: Studia z historii spolecznej i gospodarcze] poswiecone prof, dr Franciszkowi Bujakowi (Studies in Social and Economic History Dedicated to Professor Franciszek Bujak), Lwów 1931, pp. 83–99. The case is analysed in A. Malewski and J. Topolski, op. cit., pp. 68-9.
K. Potkański, “Puszcza Kurpiowska”(The Kurpie Forest), in: Pisma po-śmiertne (Posthumous Writings), vol. I, p. 234.
Cf. A. Malewski and J. Topolski, op. cit., pp. 71-2.
J. Giedymin, Problemy logiczne analizy historycznej (Logical Problems of Historical Analyses), ed. cit., pp. 13–4.
Cf. Village désertes et histoire économique, Paris 1965, p. 127.
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Topolski, J. (1976). Methods of Establishing Historical Facts. In: Methodology of History. Synthese Library, vol 88. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1123-5_21
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