Abstract
The subject matter of the general methodology of sciences, which discipline is often also called the logic, philosophy, or the theory, of science, has no strict demarcation lines. It would also be useless, as it seems, to look for such a definition of the subject matter of the methodology of sciences upon which all persons involved would agree. It is presumably more to the point to indicate the range of problems with which the general methodology of sciences is concerned, and also those with which, in the opinion of the scientists, it should be concerned. In this way we can arrive at an undisputed set of the problems which are specific to methodological research. Only in the light of this analysis will it be possible to suggest such an interpretation of the methodology of sciences which could be used in the study of methodological problems of history.
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References
K. Ajdukiewicz, Pragmatic Logic, Dordrecht-Warszawa 1972, pp. 185–190.
A strict distinction between these aspects is made by J. Giedymin, who speaks about descriptive methodology (the study of the language of science and the operations performed in research) and about normative methodology (the set of rules and theorems that guide research procedures) and two meanings — from that point of view-of the term methodology. (See his “Hipotezy, meto-dologja opisowa, wyjaśnianie”(Hypotheses, Descriptive Methodology, Explanation) in Kwartalnik Historyczny, No. 4/1962, p. 919; and Problemy. Zalozenia. Rozstrzygnięcia (Problems, Assumptions, Decisions), Poznan 1964, pp. 17 and 177.
Cf. K. Ajdukiewicz, op. cit., p. 186.
Ibidem.
J. Locke, An Essay on Human Understanding, vol. II, chap. XI, book IV.
Ch. Morris, “Foundations of the Theory of Signs”, in: International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, vol. I, No. 2/1938; Signs, Language and Behavior, New York 1946
Note in this connection selected writings of K. Ajdukiewicz, one of the founders of the methodology of sciences, J’zyk i poznanie (Language and Cognition), vol. I, Warszawa 1960, vol. II, Warszawa 1965. For non-specialists there is a popular exposition of the principles of semiotics by H. Stonert, Język i no-uka (Language and Science), Warszawa 1964
J. Giedymin and J. Kmita, Wyklady z logiki formalnej, teorii komunikacji i metodologii nauk (Lectures on Formal Logic, Communication Theory and the Methodology of Sciences), Poznań 1965, p. 15. In his modified definition of the sign Kmita omits the regularity condition in the communication by a given cultural action or cultural product of a specified state of things. Cf. his Wyklady z logiki i metodologii nauk (Lectures on Formal Logic and the Methodology of Sciences), Warszawa 1973, pp. 32-3.
See R. Carnap, “Die Ueberwindung der Metaphysik durch die logische Analyse der Sprache”, Erkenntnis, vol. 12, 1932, and Philosophy and Logical Syntax, London 1935.
See R. Carnap, “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts” in: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. I, Minneapolis 1956.
Its development is connected with the name of the Polish logician A. Tar-ski. See his paper “The Establishment of Scientific Semantics”in: Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics (A. Tarski’s papers, 1923 to 1938), Oxford 1956.
A statement with a predicate of one argument: “Napoleon died in 1821” a statement with a predicate of two arguments: “Wellington defeated Napoleon”. Syntactical categories are discussed in a popular way by H. Stonert (see footnote 7 above). We shall not take up the issue of the semantic functions (denoting) of function symbols, variables, sentential connectives, quantifiers, etc., since that does not affect the problem now under consideration. Function symbols, of course, have their denotations, too.
See H. Stonert, op. cit., p. 192.
Reference is made here, obviously, to an interpreted language (i.e., a language which has semantic rules that assign specified objects to the terms that occur in that inguage), and not to a language which is pure calculus (such as with which matemathical logic is concerned). In this connection see J. Giedymin and J. Kmita, op. cit. (see footnote 8 above), pp. 37 ff.
See J. Giedymin, Problemy (…), ed. cit., p. 177.
On the concept of truth see R. Suszko, “Logika formalna a niektóre za-gadnienia teorii poznania”(Formal Logic and Certain Issues in Gnosiology), Myśl Filozoficzna, No. 2-3/1957. The semantic definition of truth is associated with the name of A. Tarski (The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages, in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, Oxford 1956).
Cf. H. Stonert, op. cit., pp. 234–5.
Ibid., p. 245. The founders of pragmatics, next to Morris, include K. Twar-dowski, T. Kotarbinski, R. Carnap, R. M. Martin.
L. Geymonat, op. cit., p. 192.
In this connection note the definition of the method given by T. Kotarbinski: “a method is a mode of action used with the consciousness of a repetition of its application in similar cases”(in Gnosiology, Oxford 1966, p. 446).
The book mainly consulted on this issue was: R. D. Luce, H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions, New York 1957. The principles of rational actions are studied by the discipline termed praxiology. Cf. T. Kotarbinski, Praxiology, Oxford 1965.
Cf. J. Giedymin, Problemy (…), ed. cit., p. 7.
The books consulted on the basic concepts and the history of information theory included: P. H. Woodward, Probability and Information Theory, London 1955; A. M. Yaglom and Y. M. Yaglom, Probability and information (the original in Russian, Moscow 1960); J. Giedymin, J. Kmita, Wyklady (…), ed. cit. See also M. Porębski, “Sztuka a informacja”(Art and Information) Rocznik Historii Sztuki, vol. III, 1962, pp. 44-106; J. Ziomek, Staff i Kochanowski. Pró-ba zastosowania teorii informacji w badaniach nad przekladem (Staff and Kochanowski. A Tentative Application of Information Theory in the Study of Translations), Poznan 1965; J. Giedymin, Problemy (…), ed. cit., pp. 20-22 (where he quotes the literature of the subject: works by C. E. Shannon, A. I. Khinchin, J. G. Kemeny, D. Harrah, and others).
J. Giedymin, op. cit., pp. 20–1. What follows is his explanation of the concept of semantic information. To be able to speak about such information we need the following data: (a) a set y of (true or false) statements; (b) a set V of the possible combinations of logical values: truth (denoted by ‘1’) and falsehood (denoted by ‘0’), assigned to the various statements (this is the set of valuations, i.e., the universe of uncertainty); (c) a subset C(V) of V, which reduces the variety of cases and is designated under specified criteria. The following example is analysed: consider two statements, A and B, so that Y = (A,B), V = 1,1; 1,0; 0,1; 0,0. Now C(V) may be any pair which is an element of V, e.g., C(V) = (1,0). If, in reply to the question about the values of A and B, we give the valuation (1,0), which indicates that A is true and B is false, we provide semantic information, because the choice of C(V) out of the set V is a constraint on V. The choice of C(V) is, in science, based on the various criteria, but in the last analysis we are concerned with an answer that would comply with facts. (Cf. J. Giedymin, op. cit., p. 21.)
Cf. J. Giedymin, J. Kmita, Wyklady (…), ed. cit., Chap, III, “Metalinguistic Behaviour in Communication”.
The terms for the various parts of the chain of communication follow the suggestions made by S. Nowak in his Studia z metodologii nauk spolecznych (Studies in the Methodology of the Social Sciences), Warszawa 1965, Chap. VI.
The book mainly consulted on set theory was J. Slupecki, L. Borkowski, Elements of Mathematical Logic and Set Theory, Oxford 1967 (i.e., in practice, its Polish-language version of 1963).
See J. Slupecki, L. Borkowski, op. cit., pp. 297 ff. See also K. Pasenkie-wicz, Logika ogólna (General Logic), vol. I, Warszawa-Kraków 1963, pp. 112 ff.
Mereology originates from S. Lesniewski, Cf. J. Slupecki, “Towards a Generalized Mereology of Leśniewski”, Studia Logica, vol. VIII, Poznań 1958. On Lesniewski’s logic in general see E. C. Luschei, The Logical Systems of Lesniewski, Amsterdam 1962. In Lesniewski’s mereology, the only specifically mereological primitive term is the relation x≤y, which is interpreted thus: an object x is (proper or non-proper) part of an object y.
The gnosiological (methodological) level is represented by information theory as a branch of cybernetics. Cybernetics was originated by N. Wiener, Cybernetics, New York 1948. See also W. R. Ashby, An Introduction to Cybernetics, London 1958, and O. Lange, Wholes and Parts, Oxford-Warszawa 1965.
This applies in particular to the problems of time.
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Topolski, J. (1976). The Subject Matter of the Methodology of Sciences. In: Methodology of History. Synthese Library, vol 88. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1123-5_2
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