Abstract
Reflections on the foundations of historical knowledge, interpreted here as the knowledge of the past events in the history of mankind,1 should begin with a general description of the process of cognition. Acquiring the knowledge of the past, which takes place through historical research, is — regardless of the properties which might be ascribed to it — part of the process of human cognition.
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References
To be called hereafter the knowledge of the past.
A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, Baltimore 1961, p. 79.
For arguments against agnosticism see F. Engels, Foreword to the English-language edition of “Socialism: Utopian and Scientific”, Selected Works, vol. I, ed. cit., pp. 92–94.
The distinction between these stages has been made by V. Lenin.
There is an obvious difference between science and scientific knowledge: the former covers both the accumulated results of research and the methods of obtaining them, and is thus a dynamic concept, whereas the latter covers only the results of research, and is thus a static concept.
Cf. S. Ossowski on the requirements of scientific responsibility in his O osobliwościach nauk spolecznych (On the Peculiarities of the Social Sciences), Warszawa 1962, pp. 283 ff. The comments made here refer to empirical disciplines.
W. S. Jevons, The Principles of Science, vol. II, New York 1877, pp. 673–4.
Cf. Q. Gibson, The Logic of Social Enquiry, London 1960, p. 3.
The term ideology has many different interpretations. It seems the most appropriate to stress both its genetic and functional nature. Hence, if a statement has a clear class origin, which points to its connection with specified social groups (that have common interests), and if it also formulates the objectives of those groups (or the entire class), then it is to be treated as an ideology.
Cf. A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, ed. cit., vol. 3.
Cf. K. Ajdukiewicz, Język i poznanie (Language and Cognition), 2 vols, Warszawa 1960–5. See also W. P. Alston, The Philosophy of Language, New York 1964 (with the basic bibliography).
Those types of scepticism are analysed by A. C. Danto, The Analytical Philosophy of History, ed. cit., pp. 27-111. The present writer does not agree with him on many points, but also finds many of his analyses to be convergent with his own.
A. C. Danto, op. cit., pp. 34–44.
A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, Edinburgh 1961.
Cf. A. C. Danto, op. cit., pp. 54–6.
Ibid., pp. 73 ff.
This view has been formulated by B. Russell in The Analysis of Mind, London 1921. It is quoted here after A. C. Danto, op. cit., pp. 77 ff.
In the methodology of sciences, instrumentalism is the viewpoint “according to which scientific laws and theories are not true or false statements about facts, but are merely instruments used in ordering and predicting observable facts”. (Cf. J. Giedymin, Problemy, zalożenia, rozstrzygnięcia (Problems, Assumptions, Decisions), ed. cit., p. 175.)
A. C. Danto, op. cit., p. 79.
The fact that historical cognition is specifically indirect has been stressed (next to the old handbooks by Ch. V. Langlois and Ch. Seignobos, M. Handels-man, and the more recent one by S. Koscialkowski) by A. Gieysztor, Zarys pomocniczych nauk historii (An Outline of the Auxiliary Historical Sciences), Warszawa 1950; R. Lutman, “Podstawy metodologiczne historiografii”(The Methodological Foundations of Historiography), Proceedings of the 8th Congress of Polish Historians, vol. I, Warszawa 1948, p. 19; H. C. Hockett, The Critical Method in Historical Research and Writing, New York 1958, p. 8; H. J. Marrou, De la connaissance historique, Paris 1956, p. 143. The last-named author is of the opinion that because of the indirectness of historical cognition we may not speak about history as a science in the full sense of the term, as we have here to do with cognition based on faith (connaissance de foi). R. Lutman also writes that in historiography “the researcher’s attitude is basically fideistic”(op. cit., p. 24). See also C. Bobińska, Historyk. Fakt, Metoda (The Historian. The Fact. The Method), pp. 112 ff. This standpoint is criticized by W. Kula (Rozwazania o historii (Reflections on History), ed. cit., pp. 42-60), who points to the fact that cognition is indirect also when it comes to contemporary facts, and not only those of the past.
M. Bloch holds that when we have to do with physical objects that are relics of the past cognition is direct: “Quelque jugement qu’on porte sur elle, c’est indéniablement une induction du type le plus classique; elle se fonde sur la constatation d’un fait et la parole d’autrui n’y intervient en rien”. (Cf. Apologie pour l’histoire ou métier d’historien, p. 20.) His approach has been at one time criticized by the present writer, but not concerning the forms of historical cognition, but concerning the methods of establishing facts. Direct data may be used for both direct and indirect establishment of facts. The example given by Bloch is a typical case of indirect establishment of facts (i.e., by deduction). Cf. Kwartalnik Historyczny, No. 2/1961, p. 458.
Cf. A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, ed. cit., p. 151.
Memoirs, once they have been written, are treated not as a source of the “memory”type, but as a third person’s relation about certain events.
W. Kula, Rozwazania o historii (Reflections on History), ed. cit., pp. 42 ff.
Ibid., pp. 52-5.
A. C. Danto, The Analytical Philosophy of History, ed. cit., pp. 63–87.
Note that the modifier objective is used here in two different senses: when we say that facts are objective in nature, it refers to facts (and occurs in object-language formulations); in the second sense, it refers to statements about facts (and occurs in metalinguistic formulations).
He is the author of the phrase about the “research perspective”defined by a given social situation. Cf. K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, New York 1936, pp. 240 ff. L. Wirth’s foreword to that work also deserves attention.
W. Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge. An Essay in Aid of a Deeper Understanding of the History of Ideas, London 1958.
K. Mannheim, op. cit., p. 261.
It is worth while mentioning here M. Weber’s penetrating comments on value in science. As is known, he advocated a strict distinction between statements which have a logical value and norms, which are neither true nor false. Cf. M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, Tübingen 1922, which includes “Der Sinn der Wertfreiheit der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenchaften”. See also V. Kraft, Die Grundlagen einer Wissenschaftlichen Wertlehre, Wien 1937. The literature concerned with the problem of values in science is very rich. We mention here two items which in a sense sum up the issue, namely G. Myrdal, Value in Social Theory, New York 1958 (concerned with the social sciences in general), and A. Stern, Philosophy of History and the Problem of Values, The Hague 1962 (concerned with history). Myrdal claims that valuation is part of science and that we cannot imagine any “disinterested” social knowledge, which fact, he emphasizes, is not in contradiction with the striving for rationality in thinking. Stern’s opinion on history is similar; he also comes against the radical disregarding of differences between the social and the natural sciences. Yet, as the present writer has to stress, valuation applies to both categories of disciplines.
F. Kaufmann, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, 2nd ed., New York 1958, p. 67.
The term Basenentscheidungen is found in H. Albert, “Probleme der Wissenschaftslehre in der Sozialforschung”, Handbuch der empirischen Sozial for-schung, p. 48. See also R. Rudner, “Value Judgements in the Acceptance of Theories”in: The Validation of Scientific Theories, New York 1952.
A similar classification is found in A. Stern, op. cit., pp. 132-3 (universal values, collective values, individual values). The various works concerned with the problem of values, beginning with Nichomachean Ethics and Politics, had divisions into various classes of values. For the time being we are concerned only with classifications based on the scope of social acceptance. H. D. Lewis makes the distinction between “personal predilection”and “general presuppositions” (cf. Freedom and History, London 1962, pp. 202-6).
The problem of convergence and divergence in valuation is discussed by J. Bańka, Ideologia i nauki humanistyczne (Ideology and the Humanities), Adam Mickiewicz University Publications, The Philosophy, Psychology and Pedagogy Series, No. 9, Poznań 1966.
The manifestations of the valuating attitude in historical research will be treated later, when valuations in history are discussed. The criteria of valuation (absolute valuation, radically relativistic valuation and moderately relativistic valuation) will be discussed on the same occasion.
Among the books on objectivism in historical research note M. Mandelbaum, The Problem of Historical Knowledge, ed. cit.; F. Kaufmann, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, New York 1958; I. Berlin, Historical Inevitability, ed. cit.; Ch. Blake, “Can History Be Objective?”(in: Theories of History, ed. cit., pp. 329-413); Blake’s approach is discussed by D. H. Lewis, Freedom and History, London 1962, pp. 201 ff. On the same issue see also J. A. Passmore, “Can the Social Sciences be Value-Free?”(in: Readings in the Philosophy of Science, H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck (eds.), New York 1953); W. Kula, Rozwa-żania o historii (Reflection on History), Warszawa 1958.
K. Marx, Das Kapital, vol. 1, Stuttgart-Berlin 1922, p. 7.
A. Gramsci, Pisma wybrane, vol. I, Warszawa 1961, pp. 132–3.
This is merely a suggestion, which has to be worked out separately.
The problem deserves detailed research; in fact it must be treated in a broader context, namely that of methods of argumentation.
V. Lenin, Materialism and empirio-criticism, English Edition, Moscow, 1947, p. 142.
F. Engels, Preface to the English-language edition of “Socialism: Utopian and Scientific”, ed. cit.
So far the concept of probability in historical research has been most extensively treated by J. Giedymin, Problemy logiczne analizy historycznej (Logical Issues in Historical Analyses), pp. 26–38. General works (except for mathematical ones) include as the most important ones: J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability, London 1948; R. Carnap, The Two Concepts of Probability. Readings in Philosophical Analysis, New York 1949, and Logical Foundations of Probability, London 1951; H. Reichenbach, Theory of Probability, Berkeley 1949; R. von Mises, Probability, Statistics and Truth, 2nd ed., London 1956; E. Borel, Probabilité et certitude, Paris 1961; M. R. Cohen, Reason and Nature, London 1964, pp. 125-35. Works by Polish authors include K. Ajdukiewicz, Pragmatic Logic, ed. cit., pp. 120-130, and J. Łoś, “Semantyczne reprezentacje prawdopodobienstwa wyrazen w teoriach sforalalizowanych” (Semantic Representations of the Probability of Formulas in Formalized Theories), Rozprawy logiczne, pp. 91-102. Łoś makes a distinction between the probability of the occurrence of a causal nexus and the probability of the existence of that nexus. The latter is not — when it comes to the possession of a certain property (namely, that A is a cause of B)-a probability in the proper sense of the term (that would make sampling possible). The problem of probability is predominant, as is known, in H. Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, Berkeley 1951.
K. Ajdukiewicz, Pragmatic Logic, ed. cit., p. 124.
M. Bloch puts it thus: “L’historien qui s’interroge sur la probabilité d’un événement écoulé, que tente-t-il, en effet, sinon de se transporter par un mouvement hardi de l’esprit, avant cet événement mê:me pour en juger les chances, telles qu’elles se présentaient à la veille de son accomplissement? La probabilité reste donc bien dans l’avenir”. (Apologie pour l’histoire ou métier d’historien, ed. cit., p. 60.)
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Topolski, J. (1976). The Nature of Historical Cognition. In: Methodology of History. Synthese Library, vol 88. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1123-5_15
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