The Problem of Empiricism and the Concept of Meaning (1964)

Abstract

The expression ‘the problem of empiricism’ may be understood in various ways. In the present context I shall mean by ‘the problem of empiricism’ the question ‘Are there a priori judgments?’ The negative answer to this question is the thesis of radical empiricism. The positive answer to the question is shared by moderate empiricism, according to which only analytic judgments may be a priori, and by apriorism, according to which there exist also synthetic judgments a priori. The answer to the question ‘Are there a priori judgments?’ depends, of course, on how one understands the terms involved, in particular on how one understands the term ‘judgment’ and the predicate ‘a priori’. We shall begin our inquiry with the clarification of the meanings of these terms.

Translated by Jerzy Giedymin. First published in Studia Filozoficzne (1964). No. 1, 3–14. Translation based on Język i Poznanie, II, 388–400. Reprinted here by kind permission of PWN.