Abstract
Despite misinterpretations and disguisements of the analytic sphere, analytic logic has long been with us; with respect to those of its disciplines that are “formal-mathematical” in the narrower sense, it has been with us even in a highly developed form. Consequently there can have been no lack of evidence in the forming of logical categories and differentiated forms; indeed, such evidence has at all times been particularly esteemed. But, in spite of that, it is anything but exemplary. By using this word, we have already intimated that such evidence — that evidence of every sort — should be reflectively considered, reshaped, analyzed, purified, and improved; and that afterwards it can be, and ought to be, taken as an exemplary pattern, a norm./The formations with which logic is concerned and their universal forms are given at first in a straightforward evidence; and this comes first necessarily. But now a thematizing reflection on this evidence is demanded: a reflection, that is, on the formative activity, which has heretofore been carried on straightforwardly and naively, without becoming a theme.
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© 1969 Matinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Husserl, E. (1969). Initial questions of transcendental logic: problems concerning fundamental concepts. In: Formal and Transcendental Logic. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1111-2_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1111-2_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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