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Systems of Thought and their Consequences

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Theory and Practice

Part of the book series: The Van Leer Jerusalem Foundation Series ((JVLF,volume 3))

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Abstract

The question of the relation of theory to practice has been brought into a general systematic and intellectual prominence not only by the offshoots of Marxian doctrine prevalent in our generation. Those doctrines termed ‘pragmatic’ also played a major role, and the connection of these ‘pragmatic’ doctrines to the philosophic tradition whose interrelations we have sought to clarify above are much closer than appears at first glance.

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Notes

  1. See, for example, Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen (1775), in G. Hartenstein’s edition of Kant’s Sämtliche Werke (Leipzig: 1867), pp. 446–47. See also the Critique of Pure Reason, B828.

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  2. Consult Morton G. White, The Origin of Dewey’s Instrumentalism (New York: 1943).

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  3. “The Essentials of Pragmatism,” in The Philosophy of Peirce, Selected Writings, edited by J. Buchler (London: 1950), p. 252 (hereafter = Writings).

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  4. For a more complete comparison with Marx, see Nathan Rotenstreich, Basic Problems of Marx’s Philosophy (New York: 1965), pp. 51ff.

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  5. For an analysis, see W. B. Gallie, Peirce and Pragmatism (London: 1952), Ch. VII, “An Ambiguity in Peirce’s Pragmatism,” pp. 164ff. See also Perspectives on Peirce, Critical Essays on Charles Sanders Peirce, edited by Richard J. Bernstein (New Haven and London: 1965) (hereafter = Perspectives).

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  6. “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” in Writings..., p. 250.

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  7. Cf. on this subject, John E. Smith, “Community and Reality,” in Perspectives..., pp. 108ff. Smith justly claims that pragmatism is rationalistic.

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  8. “The Essentials of Pragmatism,” in Writings..., p. 262.

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  9. “The Essentials of Pragmatism...,” p. 261.

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  10. See Richard J. Bernstein, “Action, Conduct, and Self-Control,” in Perspectives..., pp. 66ff.

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  11. “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” in Writings..., p. 31.

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  12. Paul Weiss, “Charles S. Peirce, Philosopher,” in Perspectives..., pp. 120ff.

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  13. “Philosophy and the Sciences: A Classification,” in Writings..., p. 71.

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  14. See The Function of Reason (Princeton: 1929), pp. 30–31.

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  15. The Logic of Verification (La Salle: 1890), p. 222. Quoted in Morton G. White, The Origins of Dewey’s Instrumentalism (New York: 1943), p. 78.

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  16. Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics (Ann Arbor: 1891), pp. 8–9. Quoted in White, The Origins..., pp. 8–9.

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  17. The Quest for Certainty (London: 1930), p. 43.

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  18. The Quest for Certainty…, p. 92.

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  19. The Quest for Certainty..., p. 98. In this transition Dewey sees the difference between the classical and the modern views.

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  20. “Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder,” in The Philosophy of John Dewey, edited by Paul A. Schilpp (Evanston-Chicago: 1939), p. 528.

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  21. “Experience, Knowledge and Value...,” p. 528.

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  22. Logic, The Theory of Inquiry (New York: 1938), p. 161.

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  23. Essays in Experimental Logic (Chicago: 1916), p. 30.

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  24. Essays in Experimental Logic..., p. 30.

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  25. Essays in Experimental Logic…, p. 123.

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  26. J. E. Erdmann, Grundriss der Psychologie (Leipzig: 1840), p. 69.

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  27. The Structure of Science (London: 1961), p. 90.

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  28. Y. Bar-Hillel, “Neorealism vs. Positivism, A Neo-Pseudo Issue,” Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Vol. II, No. 3 (Jerusalem: 1964), p. 5. The paper also includes a bibliography concerning this subject.

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  29. R. Carnap, “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts,” in The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis, edited by H. Feigl and M. Scriven (Minneapolis: 1956), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. I, pp. 38–76. Carnap here states that in the employment of theoretical concepts there is no commitment over against ontological conceptions in the traditional metaphysical meaning of this concept (p. 44).

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© 1977 Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague, The Netherlands

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Rotenstreich, N. (1977). Systems of Thought and their Consequences. In: Theory and Practice. The Van Leer Jerusalem Foundation Series, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1098-6_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1098-6_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-247-2004-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-1098-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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