Abstract
It appears likely that judgments are similar to presentations in regard to the distinction between content and object. If it is possible to discover a difference also between the content and the object of the mental phenomenon called judgment, then this should help to clarify the analogous relationship for presentations.
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References
B. Erdman, Logik (Halle a.S., 1892), vol. 1, para. 34.
Compare Bosanquet, Logic (Oxford, 1888), vol. 1, p. 41: “An idea or concept is not an image, though it may make use of images. It is a habit of judging with reference to a certain identity. … The purpose … was to show, that the acts set in motion by the name and by the proposition are the same, and therefore the logical function of the forms would not be generically different.” Similarly, Schmitz-Dumont: “State rights means the same as when we say, more explicitly, the state has certain rights.” Vierteljahrsschrift fuer wissenschaftliche Philosophy, vol. 10 (1886), p. 205.
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© 1977 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Twardowski, K. (1977). Act, Content, and Object of the Judgment. In: On the Content and Object of Presentations. Melbourne International Philosophy Series, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1050-4_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1050-4_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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