Indirect Presentations

  • Kasimir Twardowski
Part of the Melbourne International Philosophy Series book series (MIPS, volume 4)


We turn now to the second part of the question raised at the beginning of the last chapter. The point is to decide whether there corresponds to every part of the content of a presentation a certain part of the object which is presented through it; while there is general agreement, an agreement seldom found in matters of psychology, about the earlier question, this is not the case for the question which we have to face now. Bolzano, for example, maintains “that there are various constituents of a presentation which do not at all express properties of the object which corresponds to it.”1 Kerry, on the other hand, holds the view “that the object of a concept must in a certain sense have at least all the characteristics of its concept; otherwise, one could not say that it falls under the concept.”2 We shall now seek to determine who of the two scholars is right.




Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands 1977

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kasimir Twardowski

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations