Abstract
It is the thesis of this chapter that the adjective ‘known’ adds nothing to our knowledge, and, by extension, that epistemology is very much less important than is currently believed.
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References
W. V. Quine, Mathematical Logic (Cambridge, Mass., 1947, Harvard University Press), Chapter One, 4.
K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London, 1959, Hutchinson), p. 40.
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© 1976 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Feibleman, J.K. (1976). The Knowledge of the Known. In: Adaptive Knowing. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1032-0_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1032-0_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-247-1890-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-1032-0
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