Abstract
Everyone has beliefs, with some of which, at least, he is familiar; but few understand the nature of belief. In this chapter therefore I propose to examine belief as such. My approach will not be to present its analysis from the first steps onward and in full view, but to offer the conclusions arrived at from a searching analysis which has accumulated over the years until now it seems that something like a general picture is possible.
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References
Inquiry, V, II.
C. H. Waddington, The Ethical Animal (London, 1960, Allen and Unwin, p. 29.
Ibid., p. 175.
Ibid., p. 151.
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss, ed., 6 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1931–35, Harvard University Press), 5.371. See also 5.398, 2.435.
Ibid., e.g., 5.510, 5–516, 5.523, et passim.
Brand Blanchard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London, 1950, Allen and Unwin), Vol. I, p. 117.
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© 1976 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Feibleman, J.K. (1976). On Beliefs and Believing. In: Adaptive Knowing. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1032-0_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1032-0_11
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