Abstract
There is no division of human life which has not been touched upon and altered by science, and this is no less true of philosophy than it is of other concerns. The experimental method of the physical sciences in particular has been and still is the part of science which has influenced philosophy the most. Elsewhere I have tried to argue that philosophical empiricism though developed in imitation of scientific empiricism differs from it sharply.1 Scientific empiricism is objective while philosophical empiricism is subjective. Scientific empiricism has tried to verify by means of the disclosures of sense experience the regularities which it hypothesizes in nature, philosophical empiricism has tried to verify by means of the sense experiences themselves the meanings which they have for the subject. The result is that science has begun and continues to develop a description of the world, while philosophy remains behind debating the various alternative interpretations of sense experience.
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References
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© 1976 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Feibleman, J.K. (1976). Activity as a Source of Knowledge. In: Adaptive Knowing. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1032-0_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1032-0_10
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