Abstract
You are about to read a study of epistemology, one which has been made from a realistic standpoint. It is not the first of such interpretations, and it will not be the last. The special thesis that distinguishes this realistic epistemology from the others is called ‘adaptive knowing’, because it describes the various moves made by the individual in his efforts to cope with knowledge. It assumes that there is a feedback from knowledge which conditions further learning. It assumes also that the cognitive process is a stage process, and that the stages are those involving the acquisition, the assimilation, and the deployment of knowledge.
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References
Meinong’s Theory of Objects and Values (Oxford, 1963, Clarendon Press), p. 2.
C. I. Lewis, Mind and The World-Order (New York, 1929, Scribner), pp. 121–124. On p. 60 there is a warning not “to confuse such qualia with universal concepts.” Critical realism, Lewis here wrote, “confuses the logical universal with given qualia of sense.” How mixed up can one get?
Dean E. Woolridge, Mechanical Man (New York, 1968, McGraw-Hill).
A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd ed. (New York, 1946, Dover).
Ibid., p. 100.
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© 1976 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Feibleman, J.K. (1976). The Problem of Knowledge. In: Adaptive Knowing. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1032-0_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1032-0_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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