Abstract
This anthology consists of twelve studies concerning the theoretical foundations of connectionism, which the series editor, David Rumelhart, characterizes in the “Series Foreword” as “brain-style computation”. In the Preface, the three editors (including Rumelhart) contrast connectionism with Newell and Simon’s conception of “physical symbol systems”. This conception finds its philosophical counterpart in the theories of Chomsky (regarding syntax) and Fodor (regarding syntax and semantics), which underlie the language of thought hypothesis that humans have linguistic abilities among their innate genetic endowments, an approach which connectionistic conceptions reject.
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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Fetzer, J.H. (2001). What Makes Connectionism Different?. In: Computers and Cognition: Why Minds are not Machines. Studies in Cognitive Systems, vol 25. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0973-7_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0973-7_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-0243-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-0973-7
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