Abstract
Ethics and economics have the same object of knowledge, if the maximum of value-realization, according to the rank ordering of value-qualities, is understood as the final cause of a theory of universal economics or ethical economy. In addition to the commonality of their final cause and highest good, evidence of the convergence of economics and ethics is also found in the numerous side effects between ethical and economic goods and, therefore, also between ethical and economic assessments of actions. These side effects can be seen, first of all, in the mutual influence of experiences and value-convictions, economic costutility calculations and ethical value judgments, as they have been depicted above. l Economic and ethical assessments of goods do not take place independently of one another, but instead exist in positive and negative side effects, in strengthening or conflicting mutual effects on one another. Secondly, the interchangeability of means and ends and the sublimation phenomenon of the attainment of original goals by reducing them to side effects, which are co-attained in the pursuit of something completely different, prove the ubiquity of the phenomenon of side effects. They show how important the ability to control side effects or externalities is for general ethics, ethical economy, and general economics.
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Literatur
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The phenomenon of sinking marginal morality follows from this attenuation of assurance. Cf. Vom Wesen des Geistigen,” in Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Hans Walter Bähr (Tübingen, 1980), Vol. VI below, Section 7.3, pp. 178–81.
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Koslowski, P. (2001). Economics, Ethics, and Decision Theory. In: Principles of Ethical Economy. Issues in Business Ethics, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0956-0_6
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