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Economics, Ethics, and Religion

Positive Theory of the Coordination of Self-Interested Actions

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Principles of Ethical Economy

Part of the book series: Issues in Business Ethics ((IBET,volume 17))

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Abstract

Economics is concerned with two main questions:

  1. 1.

    The question of how the use of scarce means for given ends can be economized, the economic problem in the narrower sense; and

  2. 2.

    The question of the optimal coordination of individual actions that result from the self-interest of acting persons in alternative economic systems and decision processes.

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Literatur

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  28. On the firm as an internal market, see Williamson, “Firms and Markets,” and “The Modern Corporation,” Journal of Economic Literature, 19 (1981), pp. 1537–68.

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Koslowski, P. (2001). Economics, Ethics, and Religion. In: Principles of Ethical Economy. Issues in Business Ethics, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0956-0_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0956-0_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-0364-6

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