The Uncertain Path of Empirical Reasoning, Part II: The Critique of the Argument from Design in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

Abstract

It is a widespread opinion that the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion are a demolishing critique of natural theology, that is, of the attempt to rationally justify, with complete independence from any special revelation, the presumed truths of the Christian faith, in particular the belief in the existence of a creator God of infinite perfection. At the same time it is paradoxical that the study of Hume's philosophy of religion has not reached a historical consensus about what is the positive doctrine that the Dialogues really establish, especially about what foundation in human reason — if any — the belief in the divine Being actually has. For some interpreters, Hume's stance is frankly atheistic, or even materialistic; for most of them, it is agnostic. From the affirmative side the usual move has been to identify Hume with the fmite and heterodox theism that is defended by Cleanthes, one of the main characters of the dialogue; yet, disparate positions that go from orthodox fideism to pantheism have been attributed to him. Finally, there are other interpreters who even affirm that in the Dialogues Hume offers no conclusion about the problems of rational theology, and hence that it is a hermeneutic mistake to suppose that one or some of the characters express a definitive opinion on behalf of the author of that work.