Abstract
Hume’s criticism is not specifically directed against the ontological argument, but rather against all attempts to demonstrate a priori the existence of God. But as Kant saw, this argument occupies a central position within this species of proof, for if it were valid, it would at once solve two problems which are inseparable for religious consciousness.1 As its name suggests, it would establish simultaneously the essence and existence, not of any God or first cause, but of a Being that a religious person can always unconditionally accept as the genuine object of worship.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason,trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), Dialetic, II, III, sect.4, “The Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of God,” (A 596–597, B 624–625), p. 503.
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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Cabrera, M.A.B. (2001). The Impassable Path of A Priori Reasoning: Analysis of Hume’s Critique of the Ontological Argument and Its Foundations. In: Hume’s Reflection on Religion. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives Internationales d’Histoire des Idées, vol 178. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0848-8_11
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