The Importance of Distinguishing Between Natural and other Outbreaks of Disease

  • Graham S. Pearson
Part of the NATO Science Series book series (ASDT, volume 35)

Abstract

The topic of distinguishing between natural and deliberate or accidental outbreaks of disease is central to building international confidence that unusual outbreaks of disease are not the result of prohibited activities. The key to solving this problem of distinguishing natural from other outbreaks lies in the scientific and technological evaluation of outbreaks and this is the focus of this ARW entitled “Scientific and Technical Means of Distinguishing Between Natural and Other Outbreaks of Disease”. The March 1996 NATO ARW in Budapest entitled “The Technology of Biological ArmsControl and Disarmament” concluded that “the BW challenge is closely related to problems in the public health arena, particularly the emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases. This close relationship can complicate arms control tasks, such as the differentiation between BW use and the natural, if unusual, outbreak of disease.” The summary went on to identify as a short term scientific and technological priority the finding of “a politically acceptable framework for investigations of alleged BW use in the context of the growing public health crisis in many parts of the world as well as the need to develop effective measures for enhancing confidence in compliance with the BWC grounded in the best possible science and technology.”

Keywords

Turkey Microbe Arena Nited Clarification 

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Graham S. Pearson
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Peace StudiesUniversity of BradfordBradford, West YorkshireUK

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