Abstract
Thomas Hobbes’ theory of law carries through the paradox of supporting binding civil laws which depend upon an invisible authorizing origin.
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Thomas HobbesLeviathaned. with intro. C.B. Macpherson (London: Penguin, 1968; 1651), chap. 21, 270.
Leviathanchap. 21, 272.
M.M. GoldsmithHobbes’ Science of Politics(New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966). Also see R.S.PetersHobbes(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967).
Leo Strauss, “The Spirit of Hobbes’ Political Philosophy,” inNatural Right and History(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), chap. 1. Also see StraussThe Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesistrans Elsa M. Sinclair (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952).
C.B. MacphersonThe Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).
Michael Oakeshott, “Introduction toLeviathan”in HobbesLeviathaned. Oakeshott (Oxford: Blackwell, 1946), vii-Ixvi. Reprinted inHobbes on Civil Association(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975), 1–74. References will be made to theCivil Association edn.
Oakeshott believes that such a solitary individual does exist and is a real individual being. lbid 34. This is erroneous, l suggest, because one must ask `how is it possible for an individual human being to exist without a language?’
David GauthierThe Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).
A.E. Taylor, “The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes” inPhilosophy(1938) 13: 406–424, reprinted in ed. K.C. BrownHobbes Studies(Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1965), 35–55.
Howard WarrenderThe Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 7, 10, 322. Also see Warrender, “A Reply to Mr. Plamenatz,” inPolitical Studies 8(1960): 48–57, reprinted in BrownHobbes Studies89–100.
F.C. HoodThe Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes: an Interpretation of Leviathan(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964).
Leviathanchap. 4, 100.
Thomas HobbesElements of Law: Natural and Politic.Ed. with pref and critical notes, Ferdinand Tonnies and with intro. by M. M. Goldsmith (London: Frank Cass; 2nd ed. 1969; 1889). Critical ed’n by Howard Warrender, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), part 1, chap. 2, sect. 12, (hereinafter cited as 1.2.12).
Leviathanchap 26, 313.
See esp.Leviathan, chap 1–7.
Leviathanchap. 1, 85.
See generally, Frederick CoplestonA History of Philosophyvol. 3, bk. 1 (New York/London: Doubleday, 1946; 1985), 39–42, 46–48.
Leviathanchap. 4.
Leviathanchap. 4, 105.
For Hobbes’ view of the scientific method, see esp. Copleston, chap. 5, 115–17. Hobbes is quick to note that the faculty of “reckoning” for the Romans lay in theNominaor names for theRationcinatioor accounting of money(Rations). Leviathanchap. 4, 106. It is interesting and ironic that contemporary legal analysis in common law jurisdictions gives great weight, at least in form, to theratio decidendiof a legal judgment.
Copleston, 109. Emphasis added.
have argued inThe Phenomenology of Modern Legal Discourse(Aldershot/Brookfield: Dartmouth/ Ashgate, 1998), chap. 5, that this view has a Husserlian flavour to it although, for Husserl, the subject intuitively thinks. Accordingly, meaning is provisional and subject to revision for Husserl. For Hobbes, one has a concept rather than a thought of a referent. Hobbes’ view is more Platonic in this respect.
Copleston, bk. 1, vol. 3, 109–10.
Leviathanchap. 4, 100.
Leviathanchap. 14, 197–98.
Leviathanchap. 26, 317.
Leviathanchap. 27, 225.
Leviathanchap. 17, 226.
See, e.g.Leviathanchap. 13, 187; chap. 30, 378.
Leviathanchap. 14, 190.
Leviathanchap. 14, 197. InDe Civevol. 3 of Clarendon Edition of the Philosophical Works of Thomas Hobbes, critical edn. by Howard Warrender (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983; 1651), Part 1, chap. 2, sect. 12. Entitled in 1st edn. asPhilosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society.Hobbes explains that one cannot contract with another unless the party accepts an offer. But beasts can neither make nor accept an offer.
Leviathanchap. 13, 186.
Elements of Law1.5.5.
Elements of Law1.5.13.
Elements of Law;1.5.14.
Ibid.
Leviathanchap. 4, 109.
Leviathanchap. 4, 105.
Leviathanchap. 4, 106.
Leviathan“introduction,” 81.
Leviathanchap. 15, 216. Emphasis added.
Leviathanchap. 16, 217.
I refer to the male gender because Hobbes intends that his claims only concern men. Hobbes continually describes the pyramidal organization of offices as “patriarchal.” So, even if women ever occupied an office, their role, which determines their decisions, would come from a patriarchal context.
Leviathanchap. 16, 217.
De Cive2.12.4.
Leviathanchap. 17, 227.
Leviathanchap. 26, 317. Emphasis added.
Ibid.
De Cive2.12.5.
De Cive2.6.8.
De Cive2.8.5.
De Cive2.6.8.
Leviathanchap. 5, 116.
Leviathanchap. 26, 317.
“Epistle Dedicatory”toLeviathan 75.
Leviathanchap. 21, 264–65. Emphasis added.
De Cive2.12.1.
Leviathanchap. 30, 388.
Hobbes, ADialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England.Ed. & intro. Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971; 1681), “Of Soveraign Power,” 58–9 (10). The page references will be to the Cropsey edn. with the original pagination in (¡), as noted by Cropsey.
Dialogue“Of Soveraign Power,” 59 (11).
Leviathanchap. 16, 220–21.
Leviathanchap. 25, 306.Cf. De Cive3.18.1.
De Cive2.6.13; 2.6.18.
Leviathanchap. 18, 238.
SeeDe Cive2.6.13; 2.9.3.
De Cive2.8.5.
Leviathanchap. 18, 231.
Leviathanchap. 18, 232.
Leviathanchap. 15, 122–23.
A.P. MartinichThe Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 93.
Elements of Law1.15.8.
Leviathanchap.15202; De Cive2.6.1;Dialogue73 (36).
Leviathanchap. 26, 315.
Leviathanchap. 26, 318. When Hobbes described the first fundamental law of nature early in theLeviathanhe was referring to the early stage of the natural condition when creatures did not share a language. Because of the consequences of the language-less condition, the first principle of living should be “That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farte as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre.”Leviathanchap. 14, 190.
Leviathanchap. 14, 190.
Leviathanchap. 30, 376.
De Cive2.14.21.
Even Howard Warrender misses the point that the natural duties arise before the creatures in the natural condition begin to understand each other through shared conventions about marks and sounds. WarrenderPolitical Philosophy of Hobbes1–79. Warrender does claim that the citizen’s obligation to obey the state’s laws arises prior to and independent of the creation of the state. But Wartender, missing the importance granted to language as the distinguishing factor between the natural condition and civil society, and associates the natural condition with the first act of culture when creatures make covenants with each other. Wartender ignores Hobbes’ focus upon the inability of the creatures in the prior condition to speak or write through a language.
F.C. HoodThe Divine Politics145.
See generally ibid., 210.
Leviathanchap. 29, 367.
Leviathanchap. 21.
Leviathanchap. 21, 268.
Leviathanchap. 14, 199.
Leviathanchap. 21, 269.
Leviathanchap. 14, 198.
Leviathanchap. 14, 199.
Leviathanchap. 21, 270.
Leviathanchap. 21, 272.
Leviathanchap. 21, 268.
De Cive1.3.32.
De Cive1.4.11.
De Cive1.4.21.
De Cive2.14.14.
Ibid.
This contrasts with Martin Luther (1483–1546) who had earlier claimed that God is infinite inwardness. AlsoseeKantCritique of Judgmenttrans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987; 1790), Pt 1.
Elements of Lax;2.10.10.
De Cive2.14.15.
Leviathanchap. 4, 105.
Dialogue“Of Soveraign Power,” 72–3 (41).
Leviathanchap. 26, 312.
Dialogue“Of Soveraign Power,” 73 (36–37).
De Cive1.2.12.
Leviathanchap. 14, 197.
Dialogue“Of Soveraign Power,” 75 (41).
Leviathanchap. 26, 323.
According to John Knox (c.1513–1572), if the sovereign itself were unjust, the citizenry had the right to depose the immoral sovereign. The citizen may interpret the civil laws in terms of `who is saved’ and ‘who is damned.’
Leviathanchap. 26, 319.
Leviathanchap.26, 322.
Dialogue“Of Soveraign Power,” 58–9 (10).
Dialogue 85–6(60–1), 62–3 (17–8).
Dialogue“Of Soveraign Power,” 96 (80), 61–2 (16);Leviathanchap. 26, 313; 316–17.
Dialogue“Of Soveraign Power,” 61 (16). When James I had claimed in theProhibitions del Roythat he too was authorized to resolve disputes amongst the citizenry because “the law was founded upon reason, and that he and others had reason, as well as judges,” CokeCJreported his own reply to the King in these words, “¡ true it was, that God had endowed his Majesty with excellent science, and great endowments of nature; but His Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of England, and causes which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his subjects, are not to be decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason and judgment of the law, which law is an actwhich requires long study and experiencebefore a man can attain to the cognizance of it¡.” (1608), 12Co. Rep.63, 77 E.R.1342 (K.B.). Emphasis added. Coke’s theory of law is examined in William E. ConklinIn Defence of Fundamental Rights(Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijtoff & Noordhof, 1979), 13–53.
Dialogue“Of Courts,” 79 (47).
Leviathanchap. 26, 315.
Dialogue“Of the Law of Reason,” 55 (4).
Dialogue“Of Soveraign Power,” 71 (32).
Dialogue“Of the Law of Reason,” 55 (4).
Dialogue“Of the law of Reason,” 68 (28).
They were called such even in Hobbes’ day. For a discussion of their import today see William E. Conklin“Pickinand its Applicability to Canada”in University of Toronto Law Journal25 (1975): 193–214.
Leviathanchap. 26, 322.
Leviathanchap. 21, 268. Hobbes’ emphasis.
De Cive2.6.13.
De Cive2.14.20.
Leviathanchap. 29, 367.
Leviathanchap. 18, 232.
See Conklin, “The Origins of the Law of Sedition,” inCriminal Law Quarterly 15(1972–73): 277–300.
Leviathanchap. 30, 381. And again, “for they are bound, every man to every man, to Own, and be reputed Author of all, that he that already is their Soveraigne, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their Covenant made to that man, which is injustice.”Leviathanchap. 18, 229.
Leviathanchap. 8, 231.
Leviathanchap. 18, 229.
Leviathanchap. 21, 272.
Drawing from a distinction of Roland Barthes, a myth is a second-level semiological system or metalanguage constructed from prior configurations of signs. Roland Barthes, “Myth Today,” inMythologies(Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1957), 109–59. Also see Barthes, “From Work to Text,” in Josue U. HarariText and Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), 73–81; “Theory of the Text,” inUntying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Readered. Robert Young (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 31–47. This view of myth is modernist in that it fails to account for the presentative character of symbols and of rituals in the totemic culture of early Greece, as elaborated in chapters one and three above. This is also discussed in Conklin, “Hegel, the Author and Authority in Sophocles’Antigone ”in ed. Leslie G. RubinJustice vs. Law in Greek Political Thought(New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 129–51.
De Cive3.15.14.
Leviathanchap. 6, 124.
Leviathanchap. 29, 370–71.
I am drawing here from Jacques Lacan’s explanation of the language of the unconscious amongst the mad.
“An Answer to a Book published by Dr. Bramhall called the `Catching of the Leviathan’,” inEnglish Works of Thomas Hobbes (EW) 4p. 292.
Leviathanchap. 30, 376.
Leviathanchap. 32, 410.
Leviathanchap. 33, 415.
Leviathanchap. 31, 396.
Leviathanchap. 31, 396.
Leviathanchap. 34, 440.
Leviathanchap. 26, 332.
Leviathanchap. 26, 333.
Leviathanchap. 36, 459.
Leviathanchap. 14, 197.
Leviathanchap. 33, 426.
Leviathanchap. 31, 396. Also see chap. 26, 319; chap. 32, 409.
Leviathanchap. 33, 427.
Leviathanchap. 11, 167; chap. 12, 170.Elements of Law1.11.2;Elements of Philosophy. The First Section Concerning the Body EW 126.1, p. 412.
De Cive2.15.14.
Leviathanchap. 16, 221–22; chap. 42, 534–37. Cf.De Cive3.15.2.
Leviathanchap. 31, 4546.
Leviathanchap. 34, 430.
De Cive3.15.14.
De Cive3.15.5.
De Cive3.16.18.
Interestingly, Warrender seems to suggest just such an intellectualization. See WarrenderPolitical Philosophy 250.
De Cive1.4.33.
Leviathanchap. 26, 314.
WarrenderPolitical Philosophy166–76; Oakeshott, “The Moral Life in the Writings of Thomas Hobbes,” inCivil Association103–113.
Leviathanchap. 31, 399.
De Cive3.16.1.
Leviathan chap.11, 168.
Leviathanchap. 4, 101.
Leviathanchap. 23, 291. Emphasis added.
Leviathanchap. 17, 227. Hobbes’ emphasis.
Leviathanchap. 26, 328.
SeeDe Cive3.15.17.
Leviathanchap. 26, 322.
Leviathanchap. 26, 323.
Ibid.
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Conklin, W.E. (2001). An Invisible Nature: The Origin of Thomas Hobbes’s Civil Laws. In: The Invisible Origins of Legal Positivism. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 52. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0808-2_5
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