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The Tradition of Legal Positivism in Modern Legal Thought

  • William E. Conklin
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 52)

Abstract

Why do jurists and officials consider certain norms/rules as legally binding? How is it possible for officials to insist that their role is not to question the political wisdom or substantive moral content of norms/rules? Why do lawyers and judges, to be more specific, observe from the sidelines, as it were, as if their norms/rules were impersonal and their decisions distanced?

Keywords

Legal Theory Legal Authority Personal Virtue Legal Structure Legal Philosophy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Reference

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • William E. Conklin
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Faculty of LawUniversity of WindsorCanada
  2. 2.Clare HallCambridge UniversityUK

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