Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

The Invisible Origins of Legal Positivism pp 37–55Cite as

Invisibility in Modern Legal Thought

  • Chapter

  • 231 Accesses

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 52))

Abstract

The Introduction juxtaposed natural law thought with legal positivism as the two main responses to the question ‘why are humanly posited laws binding?’ I have just described how Aristotle elaborated a theory of natural law, a theory, though, which took nature as “a second nature.” Unwritten customs were so immediately felt that they were considered ‘natural.’ The early Greek tribes shared such an unwritten sense of law, although, as we have just observed, the natural unwritten laws and the humanly posited laws were considered one and the same I now wish to take up the notion of invisibility and examine how modern legal thought has identified several very different senses of invisibility.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Reference

  1. AquinasTreatise on Lawas translated from the First Part of the Second Part of theSumma Theologica in Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinased. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Random House, 1945; 1266–73) Q. 90; Q. 91, Art. 1; Q. 93, Art. 5.

    Google Scholar 

  2. AquinasTreatiseQuestion 90, Preface; Question 96, Art. 5, Reply Obj. 3.

    Google Scholar 

  3. AquinasTreatiseQuestion 90, Art. 4, Reply Obj. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  4. AquinasTreatiseQuestion 93, Art. 1, Answ.

    Google Scholar 

  5. AquinasTreatiseQuestion 93, Art. 5, Answ.

    Google Scholar 

  6. AquinasTreatiseQuestion 93, Art. 3, Reply Obj. 2.

    Google Scholar 

  7. AquinasTreatiseQuestion 91, Art. 2, ad 2.

    Google Scholar 

  8. AquinasTreatiseQuestion 95, Art. 2.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Hans KelsenThe Pure Theory of Lawtrans. Max Knight (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967; originally published asReine RechtslehreVienna: Deuticke, 1934), 193–217.

    Google Scholar 

  10. KelsenPure Theory56.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Hans KelsenGeneral Theory of Normstrans. Michael Hartney (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991; 1979), 70.

    Google Scholar 

  12. KelsenGeneral Theory of Norms29.

    Google Scholar 

  13. KelsenGeneral Theory of Norms“Note 61,” 310.

    Google Scholar 

  14. Hans Kelsen, “The Law of Causality in Modern Natural Science,” inSociety and Nature(New York: Arno Press, 1974), 249–62, at 257.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Kelsen, “The Idea of Natural Law” (1928), inEssays in Legal and Moral Philosophyed. Ota Weinberger, trans. Peter Heath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1973), 27–60, at 28. His emphasis.

    Google Scholar 

  16. Kelsen also re-reads Kant so as to describe him as a natural law theorist. Why’? BecauseRechtfor Kant, dwells in an ideal realm without human authors. The closest that Kant comes to privileging a human author is his notion of an autonomous rational person. KantThe Metaphysical Elements of Justicetrans. John Ladd (New York: Macmillan, 1985; 1797) intro., line 227, pp. 28–9;Grounding of the Metaphysics of Moralstrans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981; 1785) sect. 2, line 414, p. 24; sect. 3, 463, p. 61. But that person is purged of all inclination or bodily desire. See e.g., KantReligion within the Limits of Reason Alonetrans. Theodore M. Greene & Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper, 1934, 1960; 1794, 2d. ed. 1793), bk. 3, p. 87. For Kant, the claim that an invisible author has created the material world is “theological,” not philosophical. An objective method, pure practical reason, produces the universal laws ofRecht.Such an objective method contrasts with the human authors who will arbitrary objects, according to Kelsen.Rechttakes on an uncontrolled character much as Kelsen describes of natural laws.

    Google Scholar 

  17. An invisible Author wills and reasons “the ultimate source of the moral law” in natural law theory, according to Kelsen. Hans Kelsen, “The Foundation of the Theory of Natural Law” (1964), inEssays in Legal and Moral Philosophy114–53, at 114–53.

    Google Scholar 

  18. SophoclesAntigone in The Three Theban Plays: Antigone Oedipus the King and Oedipus at Colonus. Trans. RobertFagles (New York: Penguin, 1982, 1984), line 457.

    Google Scholar 

  19. Hegel, G.W.F.The Phenomenology of Spirittrans. A.V.Miller, analysis of text and forew. By J.N.Finday. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977; 1807). Translated fromPhanomenologie des Greistes.1952. Edited by J. Hoffmeister).Natural Law.Trans. T. M. Knox. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).Philosophy of Righttrans. T. M. Knox. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952). This point is explained in Conklin, “Hegel, the Author and Authority in Sophocles’Antigone”in ed. Leslie Rubin ed.Justice v. Law in Greek Political Thought(New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 129–51.

    Google Scholar 

  20. See KantCritique of Judgmenttrans. with intro. Werner S. Pluhar; forw. Mary J. Gregor (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987; 1790), “Comment to sect. 86,” line 446, p. 335–36.

    Google Scholar 

  21. This is not surprising, given the criticism of the scholasticism and formalism that Pietism made against the contemporary Lutheran Church during the late seventeenth century. For an excellent overview of the influence of Pietism on Kant, see Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, “Introduction,” in KantReligion within the Limits of Reason AloneCloister Library (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), xiixxii. Pietism focussed upon the practice of Christianity, especially empathy towards the needy, kindliness towards other denominations, and interest in the heathen abroad.

    Google Scholar 

  22. KantGrounding of the Metaphysics of Morals[hereinafter cited asGrounding]trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993, 3d. ed.; 1785), sect. 2, line 443, p. 47.

    Google Scholar 

  23. KantGroundingsect. 2, line 417, p. 27.

    Google Scholar 

  24. KantMetaphysical Elements of Justicetrans. with intro. John Ladd; Library of Liberal Arts (New York, Macmillan, 1985; 1797), sect. 6, line 250, p. 57.

    Google Scholar 

  25. KantGroundingsect. 3, line 457, p.57.

    Google Scholar 

  26. Kant, “On the Common Saying: `This may be True in Theory, but it does not apply in Practice”’ [hereinafter cited as “Theory and Practice”], inKant’s Political Writingsed. Hans Reins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970; 1792), 61–92, at 61–92.

    Google Scholar 

  27. KantMetaphysical Elements of JusticeAppendix, line 372, p. 139–41.

    Google Scholar 

  28. KantGroundingSect. 2, line 428, p. 35–6.

    Google Scholar 

  29. KantGroundingsect 2, line 433, p. 39.

    Google Scholar 

  30. Kant beginsThe Metaphysical Elements of Justiceintro., line 211, p. 10, with this point: “the faculty of desire is the capacity to be the cause of the objects of one’s representations by means of these representations.” Accordingly, legal reasoning is an “intellectual pleasure.”

    Google Scholar 

  31. KantGroundingSect. 3, line 463, p. 61–2.

    Google Scholar 

  32. KantReligion within the Limits of Reason Alonebk. 3, p. 103.

    Google Scholar 

  33. KantGroundingsect. 2, line 414, p. 24.

    Google Scholar 

  34. Kant, “Perpetual Peace” (1795; 2nd enlarged edn., 1796), inKant’s Political Writings93–130, at 99, fit.

    Google Scholar 

  35. KantMetaphysical Elements of Justice“General Remarks”, line 319, p. 85.

    Google Scholar 

  36. Kant, “Perpetual Peace” inKant’s Political Writingsp. 99, fu.

    Google Scholar 

  37. KantMetaphysical Elements of Justicesect. 7, line 253, p. 61–2.

    Google Scholar 

  38. Kant, “Theory and Practice,” 77. Emphasis added.

    Google Scholar 

  39. KantMetaphysical Elements of Justicesect. 51, line 338, p. 109.

    Google Scholar 

  40. KantMetaphysical Elements of Justice80.

    Google Scholar 

  41. KantMetaphysical Elements of Justice“General Remarks”, line 319, p. 84.

    Google Scholar 

  42. KantMetaphysical Elements of Justice line321, p. 87, fn. 8.

    Google Scholar 

  43. KantMetaphysical Elements of Justice“General Remarks,” line 335, p. 105.

    Google Scholar 

  44. KantMetaphysical Elements of Justice“Appendix,” line 372, p. 140. Kant privileges a divine end in synthetica priorireasoning when he argues that all persons, except a murderer, possess a dignity. The murderer lacks dignity and must suffer death because “pure juridical legislative reason(homo noumenon)”submits the criminal to the penal law. In contrast to the people considered as individuals, the court acts through pure practical reason. The criminal, as such an individual, cannot possess a voice in legislation. Thus, the murderer has willed punishable acts that undermine the dignity of all rational beings and thereby the structure of legal authority itself.The Metaphysical Elements of Justice“General Remarks,” line 335, p. 105, and generally at pp. 99–107.

    Google Scholar 

  45. Kant, “Theory and Practice,” 73.

    Google Scholar 

  46. KantMetaphysical Elements of Justice“General Remarks,” line 318, p. 84.

    Google Scholar 

  47. KantMetaphysical Elements of Justiceline 319, pp. 84–5.

    Google Scholar 

  48. KantMetaphysical Elements of Justicesect. 49, line 317, pp. 82–3.

    Google Scholar 

  49. KantMetaphysical Elements of Justice“Theory and Practice,” 86.

    Google Scholar 

  50. KantMetaphysical Elements of Justicesect. 49, line 318, p. 84.

    Google Scholar 

  51. KantMetaphysical Elements of Justiceline 371, p. 139.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Law, University of Windsor, Canada

    William E. Conklin (Visting Fellow)

  2. Clare Hall, Cambridge University, UK

    William E. Conklin (Visting Fellow)

Authors
  1. William E. Conklin
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Conklin, W.E. (2001). Invisibility in Modern Legal Thought. In: The Invisible Origins of Legal Positivism. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 52. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0808-2_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0808-2_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-0282-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-0808-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation