Lessons of the Chemical Weapons Convention for the BTWC Protocol

  • Alexander Kelle
  • Jiri Matousek
Part of the NATO Science Series book series (ASDT, volume 34)

Abstract

Chemical warfare agents on the one hand and biological and toxin warfare agents on the other enjoy a number of commonalities. This basic statement lies at the heart of the assumption that there are lessons to be learned from the structure, content and implementation experience of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) for the negotiations of the Compliance Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC or BWC). In our discussion of these commonalities we follow the subdivision of issues which was put forward by Robinson [1]. Thus, in the remainder of this first section we will take up the common taboo against both CW and BW, the issue of toxins as the overlapping category of agent covered by both CWC and BWC, the problems of dual-use and of technological change, and the question of effective protection against CBW.

Keywords

Toxicity Dust Europe Clarification Univer 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Robinson, J.P. (1996) Some Lessons for the Biological Weapons Convention from Preparations to Implement the Chemical Weapons Convention. in O. Thränert (ed.)Enhancing the Biological Weapons ConventionVerlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachfolger, Bonn, pp. 86–113.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Bothe, M. (1973)Das völkerrechtliche Verbot des Einsatzes chemischer und bakteriologischer Waffen: Kritische Würdigung und Dokumentation der RechtsgrundlagenBeiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, Vol. 59, Köln/Bonn, Heymann.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    SIPRI (1971)The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare Vol.4 CB Disarmament Negotiations 1920–1970Almqvist and Wiksell, Stockholm.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Legro, J. (1995)Cooperation Under FireCornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Price, R. (1995) A genealogy of the chemical weapons tabooInternational Organization49 (1), 73–103.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Price, R., Tannenwald, N. (1996), Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboo, in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.)The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World PoliticsColumbia University Press, New York, pp. 114–152.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Martinez, Dieter (1995)Vom Giftpfeil zum Chemiewaffenverbot. Zur Geschichte der chemischen KampfmittelHarry Deutsch Verlag, Frankfurt.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Bartfai, T., Lundin, S.J., and Rybeck, B. (1993) Benefits and Threats of Developments in Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering, inSIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and DisarmamentOxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 293–305.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Dando, M. (1999) Benefits and Threats of Developments in Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering, inSIPRI Yearbook 1999: World Armaments and DisarmamentOxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 596–611.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Utgoff, V.A. (1997)Nuclear Weapons and the Deterrence of Biological and Chemical WarfareOccasional Paper No.36, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Garrigue, H. (2000) Detecting BTW Agents During Military Action, in this volume, pp. 121–128.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Eifried, G. (2000) Biotechnological Methods in Detecting Terrorist Attacks, in this volume, pp. 129–140.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Pearson, G.S. (2000) Detecting BTW Agents in an Inspection Environment, in this volume, pp.141–159.Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Tucker, J. (1998) Verification Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Their Relevance for the Biological Weapons Convention, inBiological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for Concern Courses of ActionReport No.24, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., pp.77–105.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Garrett, L. (1994)The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of BalanceFarrar, Straus and Giroux, New York.Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Wilson, H. (1999) BWC UpdateDisarmament Diplomacy42, 27–34.Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts (1999)Report of the 17th Meeting of the AHGDocument BWC/AD HOC/GROUP/49/Add. 1, 10 Dec.Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    Kelle, A. (1999) Problems and Prospects of CWC Implementation After the Fourth Session of the Conference of States PartiesDisarmament Diplomacy38, 12–16.Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Pearson, G.S. (1999) Progress in Geneva. Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Quarterly Review No.9The CBW Conventions Bulletin46, 5–12.Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    Pearson, G.S. (1996) Improving the Biological Weapons Convention: The Role of Lists and Declarations, in O. Thränert (ed.)Enhancing the Biological Weapons ConventionVerlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachfolger, Bonn, pp. 114–139.Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    MacEachin, D. (1998) Routine and Challenge: Two Pillars of VerificationThe CBW Conventions Bulletin39, 1–3.Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    Sims, N. (1988)The Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament. Vicissitudes of a Treaty in Force 1975–85St. Martin’s Press, New York.Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    Pearson, G.S. (1998) The Importance of Distinguishing Between Natural and Other Outbreaks of Disease, paper presented at the NATO ARW on “Scientific and Technical Means of Distinguishing Between Natural and Other Outbreaks of Disease”, Prague: Center of Epidemiology and Microbiology, National Institute of Public Health, 18–20 October.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alexander Kelle
    • 1
  • Jiri Matousek
    • 2
  1. 1.Peace Research Institute FrankfurtFrankfurtGermany
  2. 2.Institute of Environmental Chemistry and Technology Faculty of ChemistryBrno University of TechnologyBrnoCzech Republic

Personalised recommendations