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Detecting Biological and Toxin Weapon Agents in an Inspection Environment

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The Role of Biotechnology in Countering BTW Agents

Part of the book series: NATO Science Series ((ASDT,volume 34))

Abstract

The detection of biological and toxin weapon agents in an inspection environment is a subject which is extensively debated when consideration is being given to the elaboration of the Protocol regime to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) [1]. This chapter considers the various inspection scenarios being considered in the Protocol to the BTWC which is nearing completion. The role that sampling and analysis — with detection and identification of biological and toxin weapon agents — can contribute to an effective regime is examined in the light of experience gained in other regimes, ranging from the UN Secretary-General investigations of alleged use to the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It is concluded that sampling and analysis using validated analytical techniques in internationally accredited laboratories is an essential tool in an inspection environment, even though it may be used only infrequently.

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References

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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Pearson, G.S. (2001). Detecting Biological and Toxin Weapon Agents in an Inspection Environment. In: Kelle, A., Dando, M.R., Nixdorff, K. (eds) The Role of Biotechnology in Countering BTW Agents. NATO Science Series, vol 34. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0775-7_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0775-7_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-6906-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-0775-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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