Abstract
Wheeling is an evolutionary dead-end. The basket of ad hoc arrangements called “wheeling” developed to handle a few incremental trades among integrated, regulated monopolies, not to encourage or even allow competition. The effort to extend these arrangements to allow even limited competition is producing a logical and regulatory quagmire of debates about opportunity costs, loop flow, contract paths, network transmission service, back-up energy and losses, etc. If effective and efficient competition in electricity is ever to evolve, the industry and its regulators must make an evolutionary leap from a model developed by and for monopolists to a model in which competition is the central theme, not an awkward and basically unwelcome add-on.
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Endnotes
For a more complete discussion of transmission rights and CFLDs see: the PHB FERC response; W. Hogan, “Electricity Transmission: A New Model for Old Principles,” The Electricity Journal, March 1993, pp. 18–29; W. Hogan, “A Competitive Electricity Market Model,” Harvard Electricity Policy Group, October 1993
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© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Ruff, L.E. (1996). Stop Wheeling and Start Dealing: Resolving the Transmission Dilemma. In: Einhorn, M., Siddiqi, R. (eds) Electricity Transmission Pricing and Technology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0710-8_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0710-8_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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