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Handbook of Insurance pp 131–151Cite as

The Theory of Insurance Demand

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Abstract

This chapter presents the basic theoretical models of insurance demand in a one-period expected-utility setting. Models of coinsurance and of deductible insurance are examined along with their comparative statics with respect to changes in wealth, prices and attitudes towards risk. The similarities and difference between market insurance, self-insurance and self-protection are also presented. The basic models are then extended to account for default risk and for background risk.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Alabama, USA

    Harris Schlesinger

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  1. Harris Schlesinger
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. HEC-Montréal, Canada

    Georges Dionne (Risk Management Chair) (Risk Management Chair)

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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Schlesinger, H. (2000). The Theory of Insurance Demand. In: Dionne, G. (eds) Handbook of Insurance. Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance, and Economic Security, vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0642-2_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0642-2_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-7911-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-0642-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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