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Insurance Distribution Systems

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Handbook of Insurance

Abstract

This chapter details the use of different insurance distribution systems in practice, analyzes key issues in distribution system use based on economic theories of the organization of the firm, and discusses public policy and regulatory issues related to insurance distribution. The chapter focuses on what we believe to be the three major economic issues in insurance distribution: the choice of distribution system(s) by an insurer; the nature of insurer-agent relationships, including compensation structure and resale price maintenance; and regulatory oversight of insurance distribution activities, including regulation of entry and of information disclosure to consumers.

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Regan, L., Tennyson, S. (2000). Insurance Distribution Systems. In: Dionne, G. (eds) Handbook of Insurance. Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance, and Economic Security, vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0642-2_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0642-2_22

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-7911-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-0642-2

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