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On Corporate Insurance

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Handbook of Insurance

Abstract

Although insurance contracts are regularly purchased by corporations and play an important role in the management of corporate risk, only recently has this role received much attention in the finance literature. This paper provides a formal analytic survey of recent theoretical developments in the corporate demand for insurance. Insurance contracts are characterized as simply another type of financial contract in the nexus of contracts that comprise the corporation. The model developed here focuses specifically on the efficiency gains that can be derived from using corporate insurance contracts to reduce bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and tax costs.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Texas at Austin, USA

    Richard MacMinn

  2. Louisiana State University, USA

    James Garven

Authors
  1. Richard MacMinn
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  2. James Garven
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. HEC-Montréal, Canada

    Georges Dionne (Risk Management Chair) (Risk Management Chair)

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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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MacMinn, R., Garven, J. (2000). On Corporate Insurance. In: Dionne, G. (eds) Handbook of Insurance. Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance, and Economic Security, vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0642-2_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0642-2_16

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-7911-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-0642-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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