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Econometric Models of Insurance under Asymmetric Information

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Handbook of Insurance

Abstract

The paper surveys recent empirical studies that test for or evaluate the importance of asymmetric information in insurance relationships. I first discus the main conclusions reached by insurance theory in both a static and a dynamic framework. A particular emphasis is put on the testable consequences that can be derived from existing models. I review several studies exploiting these theoretical insights in a static context. Then I briefly consider the dynamic aspects.

The author is endebted to G. Dionne, I. Hendel, B. Salaníé and two referees for useful suggestions and comments. Financial support from the Chaire d’Economie de l’Assurance (Paris) is gratefully aknowledged. Errors are mine.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Chicago, USA

    Pierre-André Chiappori

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  1. Pierre-André Chiappori
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. HEC-Montréal, Canada

    Georges Dionne (Risk Management Chair) (Risk Management Chair)

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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Chiappori, PA. (2000). Econometric Models of Insurance under Asymmetric Information. In: Dionne, G. (eds) Handbook of Insurance. Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance, and Economic Security, vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0642-2_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0642-2_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-7911-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-0642-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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