Abstract
Will telecommunications in Germany remain imprisoned by its own history? Did the legislature open the prison door in vain when it lifted the telecommunications monopoly? Have the decades of imprisonment rendered it too weak to stand on its own two feet? This is how telecommunications in Germany is portrayed by many1, including its regulatory authority2. The legislature rightfully exercises more care. Instead of imposing the transition to competition from above; it restricts itself to a tailor-made correction of the specific competitive problems of the transition (I). This particularly applies to the heavily-disputed case surrounding the right of a new provider to unbundled access to the local loop belonging to Telekom (II).
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
See for example Thomas Lampert: Der Begriff der Marktbeherrschung als geeignetes Kriterium zur Bestimmung der Normadressaten für das sektorspezifische Kartellrecht nach dem TKG?, in: WuW 1998, 27–38 (36); Karl-Michael Fuhr/Bärbel Kerkhoff: Ent-bündelter Zugang — Vereinbarkeit mit der Eigentumsgarantie des Art. 14 GG?, in: MMR 1998,6–11 (7).
At any rate, its president Klaus-Dieter Scheurle writes: “The creation [sic!] of equal opportunities and functioning competition is the decisive lever also to achieve the other objectives [of the TKG]” (Klaus-Dieter Scheurle: Aufgaben der Regulierungsbehörde Telekommunikation und Post, appears in XXXI. FIW-Symposion. Multimedia: Kommunikation ohne Grenzen — grenzenloser Wettbewerb 7, Page 4 of the cover)ft.
Art. 253 ECT (previously Art. 190 ECT).
See § 1 Pharmaceutical Statute or § 1 Statute on Recycling and Waste, for example.
Hartwig Bartling summarizes the competition models: Leitbilder der Wettbewerbspolitik. 1980.
Details in Christoph Engel: Medienordnungsrecht (Law and Economics of International Telecommunications 28) Baden-Baden 1996, 81–97
Institutional economic foundation is found in Christoph Engel/ Günter Knieps: Die Vorschriften des Telekommunikationsgesetzes über den Zugang zu wesentlichen Leistungen. Eine juristisch-ökonomische Untersuchung (Law and Economics of International Telecommunications 37) Baden-Baden 1998, 77–84; shorter version also under II 4.
Summarised by Christoph Engel: Europarechtliche Grenzen für die Industriepolitik, in: Hans-Werner Rengeling (ed.): Europäisierung des Rechts (Osnabrücker Rechtswissenschaftliche Abhandlungen 50) 1996, 35–67 (42–46).
Martin Cave/ Peter Williamson: Entry, Competition and Regulation in UK Telecommunications, in: Oxford Review of Economic Policy 12 (1996) 100–121 for an overview of developments in England.
Jean Tirole: The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge 1988, 239–276.
Günter Knieps: Phasing Out Sector-Specific Regulation in Competitive Telecommunications, in: Kyklos 50 (1997) 325–339.
Previously §§ 22 and 26 GWB.
See II below.
More from Engel/ Knieps (note 12 above) 62 et seq.
More from Engel/ Knieps (note 12 above) 63 et. seq.
Details in Engel/ Knieps (note 12 above) 64.
Summarized by Immenga/ Mestmäcker-Immenga § 1 GWB2, R 182 et seq.
Details in Christoph Engel: Das Völkerrecht des Telekommunikationsvorgangs, in: Rabels Z 1985, 90–120.
Verwaltungsgericht Köln MMR 1998, 102; Oberverwaltungsgericht Münster MMR 1998, 98; Verwaltungsgericht Köln MMR 1999, 13.
The question was the subject of the Engel/ Knieps report (note 12 above).
See Engel/Knieps (note 12 above) 13–32.
A_nice portrayal by Michael Fritsch/ Thomas Wein/ Hans-Jürgen Ewers: Marktversagen und Wirtschaftspolitik. Mikroökonomische Grundlagen staatlichen Handelns. Munich2 1996, 143–151.
Previously § 26 II GWB.
See only BGH WuW/E 1429, 1432 — Asbach-Fachgroßhändlervertrag; BGH WuW/E 2707, 2716 — Krankentransportunternehmen II.
See above I 3.
More in Engel/ Knieps (note 12 above) 74–77.
See above I 2.
The writings on the analysis of property rights are extensive. Particularly graphic: Thráinn Eggertsson: Economic Behaviour and Institutions (Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature) 1990, in particular p. 38 et seq.
Oliver Williamson: Die ökonomischen Institutionen des Kapitalismus (Die Einheit der Gesellschaftswissenschaften 64) 1990, 77–149.
More on the inner-connection between long-term agreements and vertical integration Williamson (note 35 above) 97–116.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Engel, C. (2001). The Path to Competition for Telecommunications in Germany. In: Sidak, J.G., Engel, C., Knieps, G. (eds) Competition and Regulation in Telecommunications. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0640-8_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0640-8_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-3873-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-0640-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive