Introduction to Part II

Abstract

Evolutionary psychology regards the human mind as our most distinctive adaptive instrument. In Part One we examined research strategies for achieving the aim of evolutionary psychology to reveal a domain-specific collection of well-adapted tools in human mental capacities in general. In Part Two we examine the area in the field that is most well-developed, namely, mating and parenting. What is the nature of the psychological mechanisms in human (and primate) minds? I shall provide a philosophical analysis of the reasoning in these four chapters that has three aims: to state the questions they ask and the answers they give, to exhibit the logical structure of the case they make for their main theses, and to highlight the larger significance of each chapter by critiquing the likely ways people’s preconceptions will guide their evaluations of them. For instance, critics who wrongly presume that evolutionary psychology tries to explain everything are unaware that hypotheses are being tested about topics involving issues that pose current adaptive problems similar to those that existed in the environments of our evolution, such as mate choice, not evolutionary byproducts like reading and writing.