Skip to main content

Emotion and the Care Ethic in Clinical Deliberation

  • Chapter
Passionate Deliberation

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture ((PSCC,volume 8))

  • 106 Accesses

Abstract

The care perspective urges physicians not only to accept the significance of emotion but to face the challenge to work out “ways of dealing with one’s emotions.”1 With a renewed understanding of emotion arising from moral psychology, emotion theory, and the care perspective, physicians and ethicists are able to analyze the clinical situation from some fresh perspectives.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. Sherman, Nancy. “Emotions,” p. 667. On how emotion figures in deliberation, Sherman writes on page 670: “A simple matter of noticing a patient’s distress or displeasure, perhaps by attending to his or her facial expressions and bodily gestures, could figure importantly in assessing a case…. Again, emotions figure in deliberation of choices.”

    Google Scholar 

  2. Carse, Alisa. “Facing up to Moral Perils.” in Caregiving: Readings in Knowledge, Practice, and Politics, ed. Suzanne Gordon, Patricia Benner, and Nel Noddings. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996, p. 95.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Beauchamp, Tom and James Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 85–92.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 4th ed., p. 462.

    Google Scholar 

  5. As Nancy Sherman writes in “Emotions,” p. 670: “It is difficult to see how a thoroughgoing rejection of the emotions can be compatible with what is a human life.”

    Google Scholar 

  6. Halpern, Jodi. “Empathy: Using Resonance Emotion,” p. 161.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Lief, Harold and Renée Fox. “Training for ‘Detached Concern’ in Medical Students,” pp. 12-35.

    Google Scholar 

  8. “Training for ‘Detached Concern’ in Medical Students,” p. 24.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Sherman, Nancy. “Emotions,” p. 670.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Charon, Rita. “Let Me Take a Listen to Your Heart,” p. 302.

    Google Scholar 

  11. “Let Me Take a Listen to Your Heart,” pp. 292-293.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Ross, Judith Wilson. “Literature, Bioethics, and the Priestly Physician,” Hastings Center Report, vol. 24, No. 3, May-June, 1994, pp. 25–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Oxford English Dictionary, s. v. “detach.”

    Google Scholar 

  14. Gilligan, Carol. “Moral Orientation and Moral Development,” p. 43. Howard Spiro, in “Empathy, an Introduction,” in Empathy and the Practice of Medicine, p. 5, highlights the experiential problem of extreme and sustained detachment practiced by physicians when he charges that “imperturbability long practiced brings ‘alexithymia,’ a failure to recognize feelings when you have them.”

    Google Scholar 

  15. Carse, Alisa. “Facing up to Moral Perils.” p. 91.

    Google Scholar 

  16. “Facing up to Moral Perils.” p. 91-92.

    Google Scholar 

  17. “Facing up to Moral Perils.” p. 103.

    Google Scholar 

  18. “Facing up to Moral Perils.” p. 105.

    Google Scholar 

  19. Recall Julia Annas’ description (see p. 1) of virtue as a three part concept, including dispositions, affective concerns, and intellectual concerns.

    Google Scholar 

  20. Beiner, Ronald, Political Judgment, p. 115. Beiner notes further on page 163 that ‘The person of exemplary judgment possesses a certain detachment from the issues being judged, and thus is not swept up into the immediacy of passion and prejudice that often attends pressing political issues.”

    Google Scholar 

  21. Charon, Rita. “Let Me Take a Listen to Your Heart,” p. 299. Charon goes on to describe some ways physicians avoid some of the pain: “We take a detour to avoid walking by the ICU waiting room, because there are always strangers crying in the phone booths. It is too painful to be too close to such sadness every day, so we learn to get off the elevator one flight down and walk up a distant stairway” (p. 304).

    Google Scholar 

  22. Halpern, Jodi. “Empathy: Using Resonance Emotion,” pp. 161-166.

    Google Scholar 

  23. Lief, Harold and Renée Fox. ‘Training for ‘Detached Concern’ in Medical Students,” p. 12.

    Google Scholar 

  24. Landau, Richard. “…And the Least of These is Empathy,” p. 108.

    Google Scholar 

  25. “…And the Least of These is Empathy,” pp. 103-109.

    Google Scholar 

  26. Spiro, Howard. “Empathy: An Introduction,” pp. 1-2.

    Google Scholar 

  27. “Empathy: An Introduction,” pp. 1-3.

    Google Scholar 

  28. Spiro, Howard. “What is Empathy and Can It Be Taught?,” Annals of Internal Medicine, vol. 116, No. 10, May 15, 1992, p. 846.

    Google Scholar 

  29. Dearing, Bruce. Aequanimitas Revisited: Personal and Professional Styles of Physicians,” p. 147.

    Google Scholar 

  30. Percival, Thomas. PercivaVs Medical Ethics, p. 90.

    Google Scholar 

  31. Percival’s Medical Ethics, pp. 90-91.

    Google Scholar 

  32. Osler, William. A Way of Life and Selected Writings of Sir William Osler, 12 July 1849 to 29 December 1919. Introduction by G. L. Keynes. New York: Dover Publications, 1951, p. 244.

    Google Scholar 

  33. A Way of Life and Selected Writings of Sir William Osler, pp. 244-245.

    Google Scholar 

  34. A Way of Life and Selected Writings of Sir William Osler, p. 48.

    Google Scholar 

  35. Osler, William. Aequanimitas, p. 8.

    Google Scholar 

  36. Aequanimitas, p. 451.

    Google Scholar 

  37. Landau, Richard. “…And the Least of These is Empathy,” p. 106. If it were legitimate to attach such an adjective to equanimity, it should then be said that Osler supports a “connected equanimity.”

    Google Scholar 

  38. See Gilligan, for instance, in “Moral Orientation and Development,” p. 43 where she writes, “The potential error in care reasoning lies in the tendency to forget that one has terms, creating a tendency to enter into another’s perspective and to see oneself as’ selfless’ by defining oneself in other’s terms.”

    Google Scholar 

  39. Judith Wilson Ross in “Literature, Bioethics, and the Priestly Physician,” p. 26, summarizes the experiential difficulty of finding any balance through the idea of detached concern: “Anyone who has taught in a medical school hospital can attest to the lack of empathy and compassion. Suffering collects in hospitals, and treatment givers engender much of it. When I began teaching bioethics to medical students, a dean told me: ‘They come in like Francis of Assisi and they go out like Mafia hit men.’…I found that ‘detached concern’— an ideal widely subscribed to by medical educators and physicians generally—was realized thus: the students arrive with the concern, and medical school teaches them the detachment.”

    Google Scholar 

  40. As Rita Charon writes in “Let Me Take a Listen to Your Heart,” p. 305, for those who seek this balance—this temperance in the face of our emotions—there is a peacefulness that awaits: “There is a great satisfaction waiting for us all. Once we have found that peacefulness, that state of acceptance beyond the fear and beyond the need to protect, then we can help. Imagine, now, sitting in your little room with a patient, a patient in pain and confusion who mourns for his healthy self. You have the power to reach him, to make that massive movement out of yourself into his experience….Your words, your understanding will act as a comfort and a charge—a current of power. Your compassion can free your patient to understand the incomprehensible, to make sense of the tragic, to speak the unspeakable. You, together with your patient, will finally grasp the meaning of what takes place in our lives. Moved by suffering, you will ease that suffering.”

    Google Scholar 

  41. Carse, Alisa. “Facing up to Moral Perils.” p. 101.

    Google Scholar 

  42. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Carr, M.F. (2001). Emotion and the Care Ethic in Clinical Deliberation. In: Passionate Deliberation. Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0591-3_8

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0591-3_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-3892-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-0591-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics